John Locke and Catharine Cockburn on Personal Identity

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI:10.3280/sf2021-002001
Emilio Maria De Tommaso, Giuliana Mocchi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

John Locke's account of personal identity (Essay 2.27) is one of his most discussed theories. Opposing the Cartesian ontology of mind, Locke argued that the soul does not always think - for thinking is simply one of its operations, but not its essence -, and that personal identity consists in consciousness alone. Against Locke, an anonymous commentator published the Remarks upon an Essay concerning Humane Understanding (1697-99) charging Locke's view with possible immorality. Catharine Cockburn rebuffed the Remarker's objections, in her Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay (1702), depicting his view as more dangerous for morality than Locke's. This paper shifts the focus from Cockburn's defence of Locke's moral thought, to her apology for his theory of personal identity, including his probabilistic arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. This shift of focus yields an alternative account of Cockburn's originality: first, because she offered a non-substance interpretation of Locke's theory of personal identity, that, for its time, was unusual, and remains relevant for contemporary philosophical debates over Locke; and second, because, following Kristeller, in the very act of defending and articulating anew Locke's theory, Cockburn in some sense appropriated it.
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约翰·洛克与凯瑟琳·考伯恩谈个人身份
约翰·洛克关于个人身份的论述(论文2.27)是他讨论最多的理论之一。洛克反对笛卡尔的心灵本体论,认为灵魂并不总是思考——因为思考只是它的操作之一,而不是它的本质——个人身份只存在于意识中。针对洛克,一位匿名评论员发表了《论一篇关于人道理解的文章》(1697-99),指责洛克的观点可能是不道德的。Catharine Cockburn在《为洛克先生的散文辩护》(1702年)中驳斥了这位杰出人物的反对意见,将他的观点描述为比洛克的更危险的道德观。本文将焦点从考伯恩对洛克道德思想的辩护转移到她对洛克个人身份理论的道歉,包括他支持灵魂不朽的概率论。这种焦点的转移产生了对科克伯恩独创性的另一种解释:首先,因为她对洛克的个人身份理论进行了非实质性的解释,这在当时是不寻常的,并且仍然与当代关于洛克的哲学辩论有关;第二,因为在克里斯特勒之后,在捍卫和阐述洛克理论的过程中,科克伯恩在某种意义上挪用了洛克的理论。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
23
期刊介绍: Fondata nel 1946 da Mario Dal Pra, La rivista di storia della filosofia si è presto distinta, in Italia e all’estero, per aver affrontato con novità di ipotesi e con rigoroso riscontro filologico, temi e problemi dell’intera tradizione storica del pensiero occidentale. Ha dedicato fascicoli monografici al pensiero di Dewey, Russel, Carnap, Vailati, Hobbes , Hume, Aristotele, Epicuro, Abelardo, Husserl, Kant e Hegel; ha pubblicato e pubblica studi sui problemi di maggiore interesse della storia del pensiero; rende noti testi inediti e documenti; affronta l’esame degli aspetti più significativi del dibattito filosofico contemporaneo.
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Libri ricevuti Recensioni Spinoza e la temporalità plurale. Dalla teoria del tempo alla teoria della storia Spinoza nel XXI secolo: la nuova edizione critica dell'Ethica e l'orizzonte delle ricerche spinoziane tra Francia e Italia Tra sociniani e impostori: Spinoza e l'Islam. Alcuni appunti
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