{"title":"Thomas Reid on Induction and Natural Kinds","authors":"Stephe Harrop","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0317","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I examine the views of Thomas Reid with respect to a certain version of the problem of induction: Why are inductions using natural kinds successful, and what justifies them? I argue that while both Reid holds a kind of conventionalist view about natural kinds, this conventionalism has a realistic component which allows him to answer both questions.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0317","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I examine the views of Thomas Reid with respect to a certain version of the problem of induction: Why are inductions using natural kinds successful, and what justifies them? I argue that while both Reid holds a kind of conventionalist view about natural kinds, this conventionalism has a realistic component which allows him to answer both questions.