{"title":"The golden age of mercenaries","authors":"P. Leeson, E. Piano","doi":"10.1093/ereh/heaa020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries, Italian city-states abandoned citizen militaries for militaries composed of mercenaries: foreign soldiers for hire. So dramatic was the switch that this epoch has been called “the golden age of mercenaries,” and so treacherous did the mercenaries prove that Niccolò Machiavelli would later denounce them as “useless and dangerous.” Italian rulers knew of mercenaries’ infamous reputation when they hired them. To explain the puzzling fact that rulers hired mercenaries anyway, we develop a theory of military composition in which political circumstance constrains ruler choice. Comparative analysis of Venice and Florence provides evidence for our explanation.","PeriodicalId":51703,"journal":{"name":"European Review of Economic History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ereh/heaa020","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Review of Economic History","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ereh/heaa020","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries, Italian city-states abandoned citizen militaries for militaries composed of mercenaries: foreign soldiers for hire. So dramatic was the switch that this epoch has been called “the golden age of mercenaries,” and so treacherous did the mercenaries prove that Niccolò Machiavelli would later denounce them as “useless and dangerous.” Italian rulers knew of mercenaries’ infamous reputation when they hired them. To explain the puzzling fact that rulers hired mercenaries anyway, we develop a theory of military composition in which political circumstance constrains ruler choice. Comparative analysis of Venice and Florence provides evidence for our explanation.
期刊介绍:
European Review of Economic History has established itself as a major outlet for high-quality research in economic history, which is accessible to readers from a variety of different backgrounds. The Review publishes articles on a wide range of topics in European, comparative and world economic history. Contributions shed new light on existing debates, raise new or previously neglected topics and provide fresh perspectives from comparative research. The Review includes full-length articles, shorter articles, notes and comments, debates, survey articles, and review articles. It also publishes notes and announcements from the European Historical Economics Society.