{"title":"Bank crisis resolution in India","authors":"Soumik Bhusan, Ajit Dayanandan, N. Gopal","doi":"10.1108/jfrc-02-2023-0019","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nThe academic literature has examined why bank runs happen based on the work of 2022 Nobel Prize-winning economists Diamond and Dybvig. They have found the source of banking/financial crisis in terms of mismatch between liabilities (deposits being short term and savers wanting to short-term access to their money) and assets (long term and illiquid). The Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) crisis intensified when it came under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This situation provides the opportunity to study whether the elements embodied in the theoretical models like Diamond and Dybvig hold true for LVB crisis. This study aims to examine the reasons for the demise of LVB in India using DuPont financial model, peer group analysis and time series structural break in crucial financial parameters.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThe study examines the reason for insolvency of LVB using financial ratios, financial models (DuPont), financial distress model (Z-score) and asset-liability management. The study also adopts univariate structural break models using quarterly financial data covering the key financial measures used in the RBI’s PCA framework.\n\n\nFindings\nLVB crisis is like Diamond–Dybvig model, in the sense, savers requiring short-term access to their money (liquidity for their deposits) on the information of high non-performing assets, which further deteriorates the illiquid nature of loan portfolio (assets) of banks. The study finds its profit margin (net interest margin and non-interest margin) and managerial efficiency had started deteriorating since 2018. The study finds that LVB’s main weakness lies in its limited credit appraisal ability, its monitoring and weak internal controls. Lending to sensitive sectors (like real estate, capital markets and commodities) and exposure to large business groups also contributed to its weakness. The study also finds huge, elevated asset-liability mismatch, especially in the short-term maturity buckets. Using univariate econometric time series model, the study also confirms financial weakness being evident much earlier than the time when resolution was undertaken by the RBI through PCA.\n\n\nResearch limitations/implications\nThe study has implications for analysing and monitoring financial distress of banks. The study also has implications for devising banking regulation and supervision.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThe study brings in a perspective of the banking regulations using the application of PCA framework on a listed private sector bank. The authors combine an accounting ratio model and combine risk measures that could identify the incipient risks in a bank. The authors believe this will help in refinement of banking regulations and better monitoring mechanisms.\n","PeriodicalId":44814,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-02-2023-0019","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Purpose
The academic literature has examined why bank runs happen based on the work of 2022 Nobel Prize-winning economists Diamond and Dybvig. They have found the source of banking/financial crisis in terms of mismatch between liabilities (deposits being short term and savers wanting to short-term access to their money) and assets (long term and illiquid). The Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) crisis intensified when it came under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This situation provides the opportunity to study whether the elements embodied in the theoretical models like Diamond and Dybvig hold true for LVB crisis. This study aims to examine the reasons for the demise of LVB in India using DuPont financial model, peer group analysis and time series structural break in crucial financial parameters.
Design/methodology/approach
The study examines the reason for insolvency of LVB using financial ratios, financial models (DuPont), financial distress model (Z-score) and asset-liability management. The study also adopts univariate structural break models using quarterly financial data covering the key financial measures used in the RBI’s PCA framework.
Findings
LVB crisis is like Diamond–Dybvig model, in the sense, savers requiring short-term access to their money (liquidity for their deposits) on the information of high non-performing assets, which further deteriorates the illiquid nature of loan portfolio (assets) of banks. The study finds its profit margin (net interest margin and non-interest margin) and managerial efficiency had started deteriorating since 2018. The study finds that LVB’s main weakness lies in its limited credit appraisal ability, its monitoring and weak internal controls. Lending to sensitive sectors (like real estate, capital markets and commodities) and exposure to large business groups also contributed to its weakness. The study also finds huge, elevated asset-liability mismatch, especially in the short-term maturity buckets. Using univariate econometric time series model, the study also confirms financial weakness being evident much earlier than the time when resolution was undertaken by the RBI through PCA.
Research limitations/implications
The study has implications for analysing and monitoring financial distress of banks. The study also has implications for devising banking regulation and supervision.
Originality/value
The study brings in a perspective of the banking regulations using the application of PCA framework on a listed private sector bank. The authors combine an accounting ratio model and combine risk measures that could identify the incipient risks in a bank. The authors believe this will help in refinement of banking regulations and better monitoring mechanisms.
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1992, the Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance has provided an authoritative and scholarly platform for international research in financial regulation and compliance. The journal is at the intersection between academic research and the practice of financial regulation, with distinguished past authors including senior regulators, central bankers and even a Prime Minister. Financial crises, predatory practices, internationalization and integration, the increased use of technology and financial innovation are just some of the changes and issues that contemporary financial regulators are grappling with. These challenges and changes hold profound implications for regulation and compliance, ranging from macro-prudential to consumer protection policies. The journal seeks to illuminate these issues, is pluralistic in approach and invites scholarly papers using any appropriate methodology. Accordingly, the journal welcomes submissions from finance, law, economics and interdisciplinary perspectives. A broad spectrum of research styles, sources of information and topics (e.g. banking laws and regulations, stock market and cross border regulation, risk assessment and management, training and competence, competition law, case law, compliance and regulatory updates and guidelines) are appropriate. All submissions are double-blind refereed and judged on academic rigour, originality, quality of exposition and relevance to policy and practice. Once accepted, individual articles are typeset, proofed and published online as the Version of Record within an average of 32 days, so that articles can be downloaded and cited earlier.