{"title":"Abduction as a Method of Inductive Metaphysics","authors":"G. Schurz","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000098","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nLike scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of creative abduction (sec. 1–2). Two rationality conditions are proposed that distinguish scientific from speculative abductions: achievement of unification and independent testability (sec. 3). Particularly important in science is common cause abduction (sec. 4). The justification of metaphysical realism is structurally similar to scientific abductions: external objects are justified as common causes of perceptual experiences (sec. 6). While the reliability of common cause abduction is entailed by a principle of (Markov) causality (sec. 5), the latter principle has an abductive justification based on statistical phenomena (sec. 7).","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000098","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000098","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of creative abduction (sec. 1–2). Two rationality conditions are proposed that distinguish scientific from speculative abductions: achievement of unification and independent testability (sec. 3). Particularly important in science is common cause abduction (sec. 4). The justification of metaphysical realism is structurally similar to scientific abductions: external objects are justified as common causes of perceptual experiences (sec. 6). While the reliability of common cause abduction is entailed by a principle of (Markov) causality (sec. 5), the latter principle has an abductive justification based on statistical phenomena (sec. 7).