The Nuclear Deterrence Strategy of the US-Japan Alliance is Failing but Can Be Fixed

Abstract

ABSTRACT The current nuclear deterrence strategy of the US-Japan alliance, which is based on the threat to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict with China, is not credible and is counterproductive. A new strategy, based on diplomacy rather than threats, is needed. Unfortunately, time is no longer on the side of the alliance. China has been waiting for the United States to advance two critical international nuclear arms control agreements for twenty-five years. Chinese diplomats say they are still willing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. But the Chinese military seems to be pursuing an expansion of Chinese nuclear forces that will be difficult stop if it gets much farther along. Since a likely motivation for this expansion is to convince the US-Japan alliance that its current deterrence strategy can never succeed, reviving nuclear arms control diplomacy is the only viable means to reduce the risk of Chinese nuclear attacks against Japan.