{"title":"Patient No Longer? What Next in Healthcare Law?","authors":"J. Montgomery","doi":"10.1093/CLP/CUX006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A series of Supreme Court decisions since 2013 have revisited the fundamental principles of healthcare and medical law established during the 1980s in which the Bolam test became pre-eminent. These decisions represent a watershed and suggest that a reorientation is underway, in which the law is reducing the significance of the status of patients in favour of greater recognition of the human rights of health service users as citizens. Aintree (2013) suggests that respect for professional expertise probably remains intact, but its scope is expressly limited by Montgomery (2015). That case purports to bring the law’s understanding of patients into the modern era, although a close examination reveals that the analysis is deeply flawed. The Supreme Court Justices have shown an intent to give greater scope for human rights arguments, although the basis for this, as yet, lacks a clear rationale or coherence. Montgomery claims to be a radical departure from the previous orthodoxy and suggests a need to revisit many earlier cases. The human rights turn not only alters the doctrines that underpin the law affecting healthcare, but also provides a basis for the courts to assert jurisdiction. While the European Court of Human Rights has developed jurisprudence that defers to a margin of appreciation for democratic legislatures, Nicklinson (2014) shows the UK Supreme Court asserting its authority over Parliament and may indicate that the boundaries of healthcare law are being redrawn. A v N CCG (2017) seems to continue some features of the traditional approach, but R (A & B) v Sec State for Health (2017) confirms Article 8 of the ECHR as a limiting factor, while Doogan (2014) seems to limit its scope in healthcare law (in favour of being able to balance human rights issues through employment law). Together, these developments may represent a profound shift in the constitution of healthcare law.","PeriodicalId":45282,"journal":{"name":"Current Legal Problems","volume":"70 1","pages":"73-109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CLP/CUX006","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Current Legal Problems","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CLP/CUX006","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
A series of Supreme Court decisions since 2013 have revisited the fundamental principles of healthcare and medical law established during the 1980s in which the Bolam test became pre-eminent. These decisions represent a watershed and suggest that a reorientation is underway, in which the law is reducing the significance of the status of patients in favour of greater recognition of the human rights of health service users as citizens. Aintree (2013) suggests that respect for professional expertise probably remains intact, but its scope is expressly limited by Montgomery (2015). That case purports to bring the law’s understanding of patients into the modern era, although a close examination reveals that the analysis is deeply flawed. The Supreme Court Justices have shown an intent to give greater scope for human rights arguments, although the basis for this, as yet, lacks a clear rationale or coherence. Montgomery claims to be a radical departure from the previous orthodoxy and suggests a need to revisit many earlier cases. The human rights turn not only alters the doctrines that underpin the law affecting healthcare, but also provides a basis for the courts to assert jurisdiction. While the European Court of Human Rights has developed jurisprudence that defers to a margin of appreciation for democratic legislatures, Nicklinson (2014) shows the UK Supreme Court asserting its authority over Parliament and may indicate that the boundaries of healthcare law are being redrawn. A v N CCG (2017) seems to continue some features of the traditional approach, but R (A & B) v Sec State for Health (2017) confirms Article 8 of the ECHR as a limiting factor, while Doogan (2014) seems to limit its scope in healthcare law (in favour of being able to balance human rights issues through employment law). Together, these developments may represent a profound shift in the constitution of healthcare law.
自2013年以来,最高法院的一系列判决重新审视了20世纪80年代建立的医疗保健和医疗法律的基本原则,其中Bolam测试成为卓越的。这些决定是一个分水岭,表明正在进行重新定位,其中法律正在降低患者地位的重要性,以便更好地承认保健服务使用者作为公民的人权。Aintree(2013)认为,对专业知识的尊重可能保持不变,但Montgomery(2015)明确限制了其范围。这一案例旨在将法律对病人的理解带入现代,尽管仔细研究表明,这种分析存在严重缺陷。最高法院的法官们已经表明了给人权论点更大空间的意图,尽管这样做的基础迄今缺乏明确的理由或连贯性。蒙哥马利声称自己彻底背离了之前的正统观点,并建议有必要重新审视许多早期的案例。人权转向不仅改变了影响医疗保健的法律的基础理论,而且还为法院维护管辖权提供了基础。虽然欧洲人权法院已经制定了尊重民主立法机构的法理学,但Nicklinson(2014)显示,英国最高法院主张其对议会的权威,并可能表明医疗保健法的边界正在重新划定。A诉N CCG(2017)似乎延续了传统方法的一些特征,但R (A & B)诉Sec State for Health(2017)确认《欧洲人权公约》第8条是一个限制因素,而Doogan(2014)似乎限制了其在医疗保健法中的范围(有利于通过就业法平衡人权问题)。总之,这些发展可能代表了医疗保健法构成的深刻转变。
期刊介绍:
The lectures are public, delivered on a weekly basis and chaired by members of the judiciary. CLP features scholarly articles that offer a critical analysis of important current legal issues. It covers all areas of legal scholarship and features a wide range of methodological approaches to law.