{"title":"Does Competition Lead Firms to Bribery? A Firm-Level Study in Southeast Asia","authors":"Ruohan Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3435901","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Economists have paid close attention to economic development in Southeast Asia, where corruption and bribery are believed to be ubiquitous. In this article, we study the reasons why firms bribe. Specifically, we study the effects of the competition encountered by Southeast Asian firms on their bribing behavior. This article focuses on two types of bribing behavior: (1) informal payments given to the government so that it will ignore rule violations and (2) informal payments to the government to secure a contract. Using firm-level and country-level data from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam between 2009 and 2014, we find that the market competition will increase bribing behavior, while political competition within the country will reduce the likelihood of bribing.","PeriodicalId":46061,"journal":{"name":"ATLANTIC ECONOMIC JOURNAL","volume":"46 1","pages":"91-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ATLANTIC ECONOMIC JOURNAL","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3435901","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
Economists have paid close attention to economic development in Southeast Asia, where corruption and bribery are believed to be ubiquitous. In this article, we study the reasons why firms bribe. Specifically, we study the effects of the competition encountered by Southeast Asian firms on their bribing behavior. This article focuses on two types of bribing behavior: (1) informal payments given to the government so that it will ignore rule violations and (2) informal payments to the government to secure a contract. Using firm-level and country-level data from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam between 2009 and 2014, we find that the market competition will increase bribing behavior, while political competition within the country will reduce the likelihood of bribing.
期刊介绍：
The Atlantic Economic Journal (AEJ) has an international reputation for excellent articles in all interest areas, without regard to fields or methodological preferences. Founded in 1973 by the International Atlantic Economic Society, a need was identified for increased communication among scholars from different countries. For over 30 years, the AEJ has continuously sought articles that traced some of the most critical economic changes and developments to occur on the global level. The journal''s goal is to facilitate and synthesize economic research across nations to encourage cross-fertilization of ideas and scholarly research. Contributors include some of the world''s most respected economists and financial specialists, including Nobel laureates and leading government officials. AEJ welcomes both theoretical and empirical articles, as well as public policy papers. All manuscripts are submitted to a double-blind peer review process. In addition to formal publication of full-length articles, the AEJ provides an opportunity for less formal communication through its Anthology section. A small point may not be worthy of a full-length, formal paper but is important enough to warrant dissemination to other researchers. Research in progress may be of interest to other scholars in the field. A research approach ending in negative results needs to be shared to save others similar pitfalls. The Anthology section has been established to facilitate these forms of communication. Anthologies provide a means by which short manuscripts of less than 500 words can quickly appear in the AEJ. All submissions are formally reviewed by the Board of Editors. Officially cited as: Atl Econ J
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