Positively correlated choice

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-08-20 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.08.001
Guy Barokas
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We provide an axiomatic foundation for a choice model with two periods between which preferences are updated, but the second period choices are positively correlated with past choices in a manner that is unrelated to the agent’s preferences. Specifically, in our model, the agent chooses alternative x over alternative y in contrast to his past choice if and only if the difference between the utility of x and that of y is higher than some fixed cost. While restrictive in its nature, this representation captures several related but distinctive phenomena: a taste for consistency, cognitive dissonance, the escalation of commitment, passive choice, and habit formation. We also provide a representation that allows for a more general form of cost and the revealed preference implications of our models. Finally, we connect our representation to the theories of imperfect discrimination.

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正相关选择
我们提供了一个选择模型的公理基础,该模型有两个时期,在这两个时期之间,偏好会更新,但第二时期的选择与过去的选择正相关,而这种正相关与代理人的偏好无关。具体来说,在我们的模型中,当且仅当 x 的效用与 y 的效用之差高于某个固定成本时,行为主体才会选择 x 而不是 y。虽然这种表征具有一定的局限性,但它捕捉到了几种相关但独特的现象:对一致性的喜好、认知失调、承诺升级、被动选择和习惯养成。我们还提供了一种表示方法,它允许更一般的成本形式和我们模型的显性偏好含义。最后,我们将我们的表述与不完全辨别理论联系起来。
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来源期刊
Mathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
审稿时长
59 days
期刊介绍: The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.
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