Shane S. Dikolli, M. M. Frank, Zhe Guo, Luann J. Lynch
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引用次数: 1
Abstract
We investigate how mutual funds with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives vote on shareholder proposals related to executive compensation. Using a sample of 94,695 votes by 2,354 mutual funds from 2012 to 2021, we find ESG funds are 9.4 percent more likely than non-ESG funds to vote in favor of such proposals, and the likelihood increases to 19.2 percent for proposals aligning executive compensation with environmental and social (ES) objectives. ESG funds are also 14.9 percent more likely to support proposals to improve transparency, but only 7.0 percent more likely to support proposals about redesigning compensation. Our results are consistent with ESG funds perceiving greater net benefits from supporting shareholder compensation proposals, particularly those related to ES objectives and transparency. Additionally, funds committed to ESG objectives in regulatory filings are more likely to support such proposals than fund families that voluntarily signed the United Nations’ Principles of Responsible Investment.
JEL Classifications: G23; G30; M12; M14.
期刊介绍：
The mission of the Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR) is to advance the theory and practice of management accounting through publication of high-quality applied and theoretical research, using any well-executed research method. JMAR serves the global community of scholars and practitioners whose work impacts or is informed by the role that accounting information plays in decision-making and performance measurement within organizations. Settings may include profit and not-for profit organizations, service, retail and manufacturing organizations and domestic, foreign, and multinational firms. JMAR furthermore seeks to advance an understanding of management accounting in its broader context, such as issues related to the interface between internal and external reporting or taxation. New theories, topical areas, and research methods, as well as original research with novel implications to improve practice and disseminate the best managerial accounting practices are encouraged.
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