When Good Things Turn Bad: Evidence from G-7 Serial Acquirer Bidding

I. Yousef
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Abstract

This study investigates the impact of acquirer bidding experience on acquiring abnormal returns based on empirical evidence from a large sample of 10,880 bidders making 23,852 deals from G-7 countries. Both event study and regressions analysis have been used to examine the impact of acquirer bidding experience on acquirer returns. The findings show that “single acquirers” achieve higher returns, with a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of 3.354%, but this number tends to decrease with increasing numbers of previous bids. In addition, the results of the bivariate analysis demonstrate that a single acquisition alone generates greater abnormal returns than those which are part of a series of acquisitions, with very robust results even after accounting for additional heterogeneity in payment method, target status and country/industry diversification. The findings of the multivariate analysis also confirm that serial acquirers are associated with significantly lower abnormal returns. This evidence conflicts with the notion that more experience with mergers and acquisitions (M&As) will correspond to improve target valuation and thus lead to more profitable agreements. In contrast, my findings imply that shareholder wealth is destroyed by serial acquirers, which suggests that the goal of maximising firm value is not always the sole motivation for engaging in M&A activities.
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当好事变坏事:G-7系列收单机构投标的证据
本研究基于来自七国集团国家的10880名投标人的经验证据,调查了收购方投标经验对获得异常回报的影响。事件研究和回归分析都被用来检验收购方投标经验对收购方回报的影响。研究结果显示,“单一收购方”获得了更高的回报,累计平均异常回报率(CAAR)为3.354%,但这一数字往往会随着先前投标数量的增加而下降。此外,双变量分析的结果表明,单笔收购产生的异常回报比一系列收购的异常回报更大,即使考虑到支付方法、目标地位和国家/行业多元化方面的额外异质性,结果也非常稳健。多元分析的结果也证实了连续收购者与显著较低的异常回报率相关。这一证据与以下观点相冲突,即更多的并购经验将有助于提高目标估值,从而达成更有利可图的协议。相比之下,我的研究结果表明,股东财富被连续收购者摧毁,这表明公司价值最大化的目标并不总是参与并购活动的唯一动机。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
12
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊介绍: To provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and dissemination of empirical findings and analytical research in the specialized areas of accounting and finance with special emphasis on scholarly works with policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific. The following are some of the topical subject areas relevant to the journal (but are not limited to): Accounting • Financial reporting and accounting standards • Auditing issues • Value based accounting and its relevance • Theory of accounting firm • Environmental auditing • Corporate governance issues • Public sector accounting Finance • Valuation of financial assets • International capital flows • Ownership and agency theory • Stock market behavior • Investment and portfolio management • Islamic banking and finance • Microstructures of financial markets
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