Perceptual science and the nature of perception

IF 0.3 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-06-30 DOI:10.1387/theoria.22650
Alessandra Buccella
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Abstract

Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers when interpreting such science. On the other hand, I will show how perceptual science often relies on another assumption, which I call the ‘Measuring instrument conception’ of sensory systems, which philosophers of perception should clearly reject. Given these two symmetric lines of argument, I will finally suggest that we ought to think differently about the relationship between perceptual science and the philosophy of perception.
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感知科学与感知的本质
知觉的哲学理论在确定其关于知觉对象的本体论承诺时,能否遵从知觉科学?或者换句话说,知觉科学能告诉我们知觉的本质吗?许多当代主流的知觉哲学家给出了肯定的答案。然而,在这篇文章中,我提供了两个反对这一观点的论据。一方面,我认为感知科学并不致力于某些与确定感知本体论相关的假设,然而,哲学家在解释这种科学时通常依赖于这些假设。另一方面,我将展示感知科学如何经常依赖于另一个假设,我称之为感觉系统的“测量仪器概念”,这是感知哲学家应该明确拒绝的。考虑到这两种对称的论点,我最后建议我们应该以不同的方式思考感知科学和感知哲学之间的关系。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
65
期刊介绍: Since its foundation in 1935, Theoria publishes research in all areas of philosophy. Theoria is committed to precision and clarity in philosophical discussions, and encourages cooperation between philosophy and other disciplines. The journal is not affiliated with any particular school or faction. Instead, it promotes dialogues between different philosophical viewpoints. Theoria is peer-reviewed. It publishes articles, reviews, and shorter notes and discussions. Short discussion notes on recent articles in Theoria are welcome.
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