Figuring it out the hard way: America, France, and the challenges of allied pursuit of nuclear weapons, 1958–63

Abstract

ABSTRACT The US nuclear-policy community did not always accept today’s conventional wisdom that a state’s first nuclear test is a critical milestone; that even a small, rudimentary nuclear arsenal is a major concern; and that preventing states, even allies, from acquiring nuclear weapons should be a core US foreign-policy goal. Between 1958 and 1963, Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy experimented with three different responses to the French nuclear-weapons program: (1) offering to share US-owned nuclear weapons liberally; (2) leaving France to pursue nuclear weapons unaided; and (3) offering to sell France advanced submarines and missiles. Each of these approaches was the product of evolving beliefs about when a state “went nuclear,” the potency of small arsenals, and whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons among allies undermined or advanced US interests. Understanding how Washington shifted its stance during this period sheds important light on the origins and nature of US nonproliferation policy today.