Fenno’s Paradox in a Polarized Age: How Polarization Lowers the Mass Public’s Assessments of Congress and Legislators

B. Bae, Carlos Algara
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Abstract

Abstract Fenno (1975) famously posited that the mass public’s assessments of the U.S. Congress are rooted in a paradox, with citizens holding negative evaluations of the collective Congress while holding favorable views of their individual members of Congress. Since the conceptualization of “Fenno’s Paradox,” Congress underwent pronounced changes due to increased ideological polarization between increasingly homogeneous parties comprised of more partisan loyal, ideologically extreme legislators. In this article, we ask whether this partisan polarization shifted the public’s assessments of Congress and their individual representatives over time. Leveraging over 45 years of new data measuring the monthly approval of Congress and legislators with generalized error correction models, we find that greater polarization lowers the approval rating of both over time, suggesting that greater polarization weakens Fenno’s Paradox by considerably lowering legislator approval. We explore the underlying mechanism of this finding at the individual level, finding that co-partisan support for Congress and opposing-partisan support for legislators has collapsed since 1980. Taken together, our results suggest that partisan polarization plays a large role in motivating the historic decline in congressional approval and the ability of legislators to amass a personal incumbency advantage.
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两极分化时代的芬诺悖论:两极分化如何降低公众对国会和立法者的评价
摘要Fenno(1975)提出了一个著名的观点,即大众对美国国会的评估植根于一个悖论,公民对集体国会持负面评价,而对其国会议员持正面看法。自“芬诺悖论”概念化以来,由于由党派忠诚、意识形态极端的立法者组成的日益同质的政党之间的意识形态两极分化加剧,国会发生了明显的变化。在这篇文章中,我们要问的是,随着时间的推移,这种党派两极分化是否改变了公众对国会及其个人代表的评估。利用超过45年的新数据,用广义误差校正模型衡量国会和立法者的月度批准率,我们发现,随着时间的推移,更大的两极分化会降低两者的支持率,这表明更大的极化会大大降低立法者的批准率,从而削弱芬诺悖论。我们在个人层面探索了这一发现的潜在机制,发现自1980年以来,对国会的两党支持和对立法者的反对党派支持已经崩溃。总之,我们的研究结果表明,党派两极分化在推动国会批准率和立法者积累个人在职优势的能力的历史性下降方面发挥了重要作用。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
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