Taking Steel Seizure Seriously: The Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW Fordham Law Review Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2903574
S. Estreicher, S. Menashi
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Abstract

This article examines the constitutional validity of President Obama's decision, as part of his 2015 agreement with Iran, effectively to repeal 17 different sanctions laws for the 15-year life of the agreement. Although Congress had legislated extensively in this area, the President effected this change by entering into a "nonbinding political agreement" with Iran and by aggregating individual waiver provisions in the sanctions laws into an-across-the-board waiver of sanctions. We argue that the commitments made by the President in the Iran agreement violate a fundamental separation-of-powers limit on executive power—what we term "the Steel Seizure principle," after the Youngstown Steel Seizure Case. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in the Steel Seizure Case, the President does not have lawmaking power even where national-security and foreign-relations concerns are at stake. A vast literature has grown around the Steel Seizure Case, especially the influential concurring opinion by Justice Robert Jackson. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the majority view of the Justices that President Truman’s seizure order was unlawful not because it contravened any express statutory prohibition but because it flouted the congressional "plan" for addressing the particular policy issue. This central aspect of the Steel Seizure Case highlights what is particularly problematic about President Obama's decision to aggregate authorities in the sanctions laws and to commit the United States to an across-the-board waiver of nuclear-related sanctions pursuant to his agreement with Iran. The President treated the waiver provisions as an invitation to end the congressionally prescribed sanctions regime for addressing Iran's nuclear weapons program and to replace it with his own non-sanctions regime for addressing the same issue. Yet the President lacks the unilateral power to overturn Congress's prescribed policy and to replace it with his own.The President is both an agent and, particularly in the foreign relations area, can be viewed as a co-principal with Congress. The Steel Seizure principle highlights the limits of the co-principal conception of the President. Once Congress has developed a legislative framework for a subject matter, that framework occupies the field; the President's role becomes one of a responsible agent. In the Iran sanctions laws, Congress provided bounded waiver authority, acting responsibly to allow limited executive discretion rather than requiring the President to seek new legislation each time flexibility was needed. It did not, however, invite the President to override the sanctions framework altogether, as occurred in connection with the Iran nuclear agreement. An emergent literature in administrative law has praised Congress's delegation of waiver authority to the executive branch as providing needed flexibility and other policy benefits. Yet that literature recognizes that the President's exercise of waiver authority must be carefully circumscribed to avoid the problem of the President revising a statutory regime out of disagreement with Congress's policy choices. Such limiting principles are no less necessary in the foreign-affairs context, where the President has used purported waiver authority in the Iran sanctions statutes to pursue his own independent policy in defiance of Congress.
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认真对待钢铁夺权:伊核协议与三权分立
这篇文章考察了奥巴马总统的决定的宪法有效性,作为他2015年与伊朗达成的协议的一部分,该决定在协议的15年期限内有效地废除了17项不同的制裁法。尽管国会在这一领域进行了广泛的立法,但总统通过与伊朗签订“非约束性政治协议”,并将制裁法中的个人豁免条款合并为全面豁免制裁,实现了这一改变。我们认为,总统在伊朗协议中做出的承诺违反了对行政权力的基本分权限制——在扬斯敦钢铁扣押案之后,我们称之为“钢铁扣押原则”。正如最高法院在钢铁扣押案中重申的那样,即使在事关国家安全和外交关系的情况下,总统也没有立法权。大量的文献围绕着钢铁扣押案展开,尤其是罗伯特·杰克逊大法官的有影响力的赞同意见。然而,大多数法官认为杜鲁门总统的扣押令是非法的,这并不是因为它违反了任何明确的法定禁令,而是因为它藐视了国会解决特定政策问题的“计划”。钢铁扣押案的这一核心方面突显了奥巴马总统决定在制裁法中集中权力,并根据他与伊朗的协议承诺美国全面放弃核相关制裁的问题。总统将豁免条款视为邀请结束国会规定的针对伊朗核武器计划的制裁制度,并用他自己的非制裁制度取代该制度来解决同一问题。然而,总统缺乏推翻国会规定政策并用自己的政策取而代之的单方面权力。总统既是代理人,尤其是在外交关系领域,可以被视为与国会的共同负责人。钢铁扣押原则突出了总统共同主体概念的局限性。一旦国会为某一主题制定了立法框架,该框架就占据了该领域;总统的角色变成了一个负责任的代理人。在伊朗制裁法中,国会提供了有限的豁免权,采取负责任的行动,允许有限的行政自由裁量权,而不是要求总统在每次需要灵活性时寻求新的立法。然而,它并没有像伊朗核协议那样邀请总统完全推翻制裁框架。一篇新兴的行政法文献赞扬了国会将豁免权下放给行政部门,认为这提供了必要的灵活性和其他政策利益。然而,该文献承认,必须谨慎限制总统行使豁免权,以避免总统因与国会的政策选择不一致而修改法定制度的问题。在外交事务中,这种限制原则同样必要,总统利用伊朗制裁法规中所谓的豁免权,无视国会,推行自己的独立政策。
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期刊介绍: The Fordham Law Review is a scholarly journal serving the legal profession and the public by discussing current legal issues. Approximately 75 articles, written by students or submitted by outside authors, are published each year. Each volume comprises six books, three each semester, totaling over 3,000 pages. Managed by a board of up to eighteen student editors, the Law Review is a working journal, not merely an honor society. Nevertheless, Law Review membership is considered among the highest scholarly achievements at the Law School.
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