The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon

Abstract

ition as it is found in the West – and create a platform to challenge notions of international responsibilities historically or symbolically attached to the West and to reframe them according to non-Western visions. Finally, the resurgence of populist nationalism in Western countries as a considerable political force presents a challenge to the protection of human rights, due to the will to prioritise narrow nationalistic interests over the promotion of an agenda of global responsibilities. It is also for this reason that Ukraine has had difficulties to find allies in some quarters of the globe where these populist nationalists rose to power. The example of the Russian invasion of Ukraine within the parameters presented by Glanville is just one illustration of how ‘Sharing Responsibility’s argument may enter in a dialogue with the most pressing issues in international politics at the moment, in a more and more politically, economically, ideologically and technologically polarised world, and with the research agenda of IR scholars concerned with a number of issues. One can clearly see that Glanville’s significant contribution to the R2P literature will provide important tools to those interested in researching on topics dealing with the future of R2P, such as the impact of climate change on atrocity prevention, the nexus between the Women, Peace and Security agenda and R2P, and the interface between R2P and peace operations whose doctrine, strategies and practices are going through significant changes at the moment.