{"title":"Extinction, law and thinking emotionally about invertebrates","authors":"K. Woolaston, Afshin Akhtar-Khavari","doi":"10.1080/10383441.2020.1938798","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The extinction of a species can provoke deep feelings of sadness, injustice, compassion and empathy for the individuals lost. In this paper we argue that law, as a governance institution, does not allow decision-makers the use of emotions such as compassion or empathy, when making decisions relevant to the possible extinction of species, despite evidence to suggest that such emotions elevate the importance of moral concerns, and so may be utilised to halt the extinction process. Further, we argue that law can impact our ability to feel compassion and empathy for species heading towards extinction, as it creates a narrative of apathy. This is particularly exacerbated when it comes to the potential extinction of invertebrates, whose needs and interests are often already subject to people’s negative emotional pre-dispositions. By analysing the recent legal decisions surrounding the approval of the Yeelirrie Uranium mine in Western Australia, we highlight the nature of this problem and what it means for the conservation of invertebrate species, and argue that environmental law’s commitment to utilitarian and rational traditions will continue to challenge how we react to, and allow, the extinction of invertebrate.","PeriodicalId":45376,"journal":{"name":"Griffith Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10383441.2020.1938798","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Griffith Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2020.1938798","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
ABSTRACT The extinction of a species can provoke deep feelings of sadness, injustice, compassion and empathy for the individuals lost. In this paper we argue that law, as a governance institution, does not allow decision-makers the use of emotions such as compassion or empathy, when making decisions relevant to the possible extinction of species, despite evidence to suggest that such emotions elevate the importance of moral concerns, and so may be utilised to halt the extinction process. Further, we argue that law can impact our ability to feel compassion and empathy for species heading towards extinction, as it creates a narrative of apathy. This is particularly exacerbated when it comes to the potential extinction of invertebrates, whose needs and interests are often already subject to people’s negative emotional pre-dispositions. By analysing the recent legal decisions surrounding the approval of the Yeelirrie Uranium mine in Western Australia, we highlight the nature of this problem and what it means for the conservation of invertebrate species, and argue that environmental law’s commitment to utilitarian and rational traditions will continue to challenge how we react to, and allow, the extinction of invertebrate.