{"title":"Does the Second Amendment Make Gun Politics Obsolete?","authors":"Joseph Blocher, Andrew Willinger","doi":"10.1086/724162","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"InAmerican law, the boundaries of regulation are set by—among other things— politics and the Constitution. Either one can serve as a constraint. Regulations that are politically unpopular or otherwise unfeasible are non-starters regardless of whether they satisfy the Constitution. Regulations that violate the Constitution, on the other hand, may be tremendously popular but will often be struck down by courts. The line between these political and constitutional constraints is never entirely clear, as political rhetoric and constitutional doctrine borrow from one another in innumerable ways. Elected officials take oaths to uphold the Constitution; judges often act in ways that appear political. But in a broad sense, judges are more commonly associated with the enforcement of constitutional law and regularly deny that they are doing politics—a matter for elected officials. Recognizing some slippage between the categories, we can draw a line between judge-enforced constitutional law and democratic politics. Formost of American history, the balance of gun rights and regulationwas set by politics—not, as one might suspect from its prominence in the current gun debate, the Second Amendment. Decisions about gun law were made by elected officials at the federal, state, and local level, responding to different forms of political pressure.","PeriodicalId":46912,"journal":{"name":"Polity","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Polity","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724162","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
InAmerican law, the boundaries of regulation are set by—among other things— politics and the Constitution. Either one can serve as a constraint. Regulations that are politically unpopular or otherwise unfeasible are non-starters regardless of whether they satisfy the Constitution. Regulations that violate the Constitution, on the other hand, may be tremendously popular but will often be struck down by courts. The line between these political and constitutional constraints is never entirely clear, as political rhetoric and constitutional doctrine borrow from one another in innumerable ways. Elected officials take oaths to uphold the Constitution; judges often act in ways that appear political. But in a broad sense, judges are more commonly associated with the enforcement of constitutional law and regularly deny that they are doing politics—a matter for elected officials. Recognizing some slippage between the categories, we can draw a line between judge-enforced constitutional law and democratic politics. Formost of American history, the balance of gun rights and regulationwas set by politics—not, as one might suspect from its prominence in the current gun debate, the Second Amendment. Decisions about gun law were made by elected officials at the federal, state, and local level, responding to different forms of political pressure.
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1968, Polity has been committed to the publication of scholarship reflecting the full variety of approaches to the study of politics. As journals have become more specialized and less accessible to many within the discipline of political science, Polity has remained ecumenical. The editor and editorial board welcome articles intended to be of interest to an entire field (e.g., political theory or international politics) within political science, to the discipline as a whole, and to scholars in related disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities. Scholarship of this type promises to be highly "productive" - that is, to stimulate other scholars to ask fresh questions and reconsider conventional assumptions.