The Chain Principle: Equilibrium Between a Regulatory Need and Its Effects

IF 0.5 Q3 LAW European Company Law Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI:10.54648/eucl2020033
Domingos Freire De Andrade
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Abstract

This article addresses the tension between the need to regulate takeovers activity through the chain principle, as to ensure minority shareholders protection and equal treatment of shareholders, and the adverse effects that may arise from that regulation. An explanation of how the chain principle is regulated in the United Kingdom and difficulties in applying the chain principle rules, particularly, to ascertain the chain price. Different possibilities Germany is offered and the Sky bid is presented as an example of the practical of how the chain principle could be designed are considered, namely regarding the most suitable method to ascertain the chain price and the most adequate entity to do it. The article ultimately concludes that the chain principle is a regulatory need because the mandatory bid rule could not be successfully achieved without the chain principle and that there is no perfect solution to find an equilibrium between the need to regulate the chain principle and its adverse effects, as rules enhancing the probability of an offer being made may have a negative impact on the premium value; while rules enhancing the premium value may have a negative impact on the probability of an offer being made. chain principle, mandatory bid, cascade offer, takeover regulation, minority shareholders protection, equal treatment of shareholders, market for corporate control, control, significance test, premium value
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链式原则:监管需求与其效果之间的平衡
本文解决了通过连锁原则监管收购活动的必要性之间的紧张关系,以确保保护少数股东和平等对待股东,以及该监管可能产生的不利影响。解释连锁原则在英国是如何监管的,以及应用连锁原则规则的困难,特别是在确定连锁价格方面。德国提供了不同的可能性,Sky的投标被作为考虑如何设计连锁原则的实践例子,即关于确定连锁价格的最合适方法和最适当的实体。本文最终得出结论:链式原则是一种监管需要,因为没有链式原则,强制竞价规则就无法成功实现,而且在监管链式原则的必要性及其不利影响之间没有完美的解决方案,因为提高要约提出概率的规则可能对溢价价值产生负面影响;而提高溢价的规则可能会对要约的可能性产生负面影响。连锁原则、强制出价、级联要约、收购监管、中小股东保护、股东平等待遇、公司控制权市场化、控制权、显著性检验、溢价价值
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