{"title":"The Evolution of Pollution Auctions","authors":"I. MacKenzie","doi":"10.1086/717898","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article traces the evolution of pollution auctions. The article examines how auction design began with an initially simple auction format and has progressed over time, focusing on auctions in three key pollution regulation programs: the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the California Cap-and-Trade Program. In response to the unique characteristics of pollution regulation, which is aimed at achieving both cost containment and market participation, regulators have created novel and interesting auction designs. The article reviews the theoretical and experimental evidence concerning the outcomes of current auction programs and highlights unique design features of these regulatory systems that are fundamental to both their development and success. A key finding of the article is that even small changes in auction design can lead to significant differences in auction outcomes.","PeriodicalId":47676,"journal":{"name":"Review of Environmental Economics and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Environmental Economics and Policy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717898","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
This article traces the evolution of pollution auctions. The article examines how auction design began with an initially simple auction format and has progressed over time, focusing on auctions in three key pollution regulation programs: the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the California Cap-and-Trade Program. In response to the unique characteristics of pollution regulation, which is aimed at achieving both cost containment and market participation, regulators have created novel and interesting auction designs. The article reviews the theoretical and experimental evidence concerning the outcomes of current auction programs and highlights unique design features of these regulatory systems that are fundamental to both their development and success. A key finding of the article is that even small changes in auction design can lead to significant differences in auction outcomes.
期刊介绍：
The Review of Environmental Economics and Policy fills the gap between traditional academic journals and the general interest press by providing a widely accessible yet scholarly source for the latest thinking on environmental economics and related policy. The Review publishes symposia, articles, and regular features that contribute to one or more of the following goals: •to identify and synthesize lessons learned from recent and ongoing environmental economics research; •to provide economic analysis of environmental policy issues; •to promote the sharing of ideas and perspectives among the various sub-fields of environmental economics;
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