Online Stochastic Buy-Sell Mechanism for VNF Chains in the NFV Market

IF 13.8 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI:10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659259
Xiaoxi Zhang, Zhiyi Huang, Chuan Wu, Zongpeng Li, F. Lau
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引用次数: 35

Abstract

With the recent advent of network functions virtualization (NFV), enterprises and businesses are looking into network service provisioning through the service chains of virtual network functions (VNFs), instead of relying on dedicated hardware middleboxes. Accompanying this trend, an NFV market is emerging, where NFV service providers create VNF instances, assemble VNF service chains, and sell them for the use of customers, using resources (computing, bandwidth) that they own or rent from other resource suppliers. Efficient service chain provisioning and pricing mechanisms are still missing, to charge assembled service chains according to demand and the supply of resources at any time. We propose an online stochastic auction mechanism for on-demand service chain provisioning and pricing at an NFV provider. Our auction takes in buy bids for service chains from multiple customers and sell bids from various resource suppliers to supplement the NFV provider’s geo-distributed resource pool, with resource occupation/contribution durations. We extend online primal-dual optimization framework for handling both buyers and sellers, with a new competitive analysis. The online mechanism maximizes the expected social welfare of the NFV ecosystem (the NFV provider, customers and resource suppliers) with a good competitive ratio as compared with the expected offline optimal social welfare, while guaranteeing truthfulness in bidding, individual rationality for both buyers and sellers, and polynomial time for computation. We evaluate our mechanism through trace-driven simulation studies, and demonstrate a close-to-offline-optimal performance in expected social welfare under realistic settings.
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NFV市场中VNF链的在线随机买卖机制
随着网络功能虚拟化(NFV)的出现,企业和企业正在通过虚拟网络功能(VNFs)服务链来提供网络服务,而不是依赖于专用的硬件中间体。伴随着这一趋势,一个NFV市场正在出现,NFV服务提供商创建VNF实例,组装VNF服务链,并将其出售给客户使用,使用他们拥有的或从其他资源供应商那里租用的资源(计算、带宽)。缺乏有效的服务链供给和定价机制,能够随时根据需求和资源供给对已组装的服务链进行收费。我们提出了一种在线随机拍卖机制,用于NFV提供商的按需服务链供应和定价。我们的拍卖接受来自多个客户的服务链购买投标和来自各种资源供应商的出售投标,以补充NFV提供商的地理分布资源池,包括资源占用/贡献持续时间。我们扩展了在线原始-对偶优化框架来处理买家和卖家,并进行了新的竞争分析。在线机制使NFV生态系统(NFV提供商、客户和资源供应商)的预期社会福利最大化,与线下预期最优社会福利相比具有良好的竞争比,同时保证了竞价的真实性、买卖双方的个体合理性和计算时间的多项式性。我们通过跟踪驱动的模拟研究来评估我们的机制,并在现实环境下展示了在预期社会福利下接近离线最优的性能。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) is a prestigious journal that covers various topics related to Computer Networks and Communications (Q1) as well as Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Q1). Each issue of JSAC is dedicated to a specific technical topic, providing readers with an up-to-date collection of papers in that area. The journal is highly regarded within the research community and serves as a valuable reference. The topics covered by JSAC issues span the entire field of communications and networking, with recent issue themes including Network Coding for Wireless Communication Networks, Wireless and Pervasive Communications for Healthcare, Network Infrastructure Configuration, Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols, Body Area Networking: Technology and Applications, Underwater Wireless Communication Networks, Game Theory in Communication Systems, and Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow’s Communication Networks.
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