Transparency and Fairness in Organizational Decisions: An Experimental Investigation Using the Paired Ultimatum Game

IF 2.9 Q2 MANAGEMENT Strategy Science Pub Date : 2020-03-01 DOI:10.1287/stsc.2019.0100

Jared Nai, Reddi Kotha, Jayanth Narayanan, P. Puranam

引用次数: 8

Abstract

Organizations often keep secret their decisions about what employees receive (e.g., salary, budgets, benefits) to manage fairness concerns. We propose that this can be counterproductive because of ...

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组织决策的透明性与公平性——基于配对终极博弈的实验研究

组织通常对员工的收入（如工资、预算、福利）决策保密，以管理公平问题。我们建议，这可能会适得其反，因为。。。

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来源期刊

Strategy Science MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

6.30

自引率

5.10%

发文量

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