Nuclear India and the Changing Landscape of Escalation in Southern Asia

Q2 Social Sciences Nonproliferation Review Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI:10.1080/10736700.2021.1996683
R. Akhtar
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Abstract

The theory of the nuclear revolution posits that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, coupled with the ease with which mutual second-strike capabilities can be obtained and secured, has made mutual vulnerability an undeniable fact. This reality has made military victories impossible to achieve in a conflict between two nuclear-armed states. As a result, the status quo is easier to maintain, given that the security of a state in possession of survivable and secure second-strike capabilities is guaranteed. This, according to the theory, is the case because nuclear weapons attenuate or even eliminate the rather destabilizing security dilemma that has hitherto increased mistrust between rivals and competitors. The size of an adversary’s arsenal, or the overall military imbalance, becomes irrelevant. Moreover, nuclear superiority does not matter under conditions of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Overall, the theory posits that nuclear weapons make states more secure. Further, by eliminating the quest for winning a series of security competitions, they help to make the world safer. That countries with nuclear weapons hold hostage things that other nuclear states value is an indication that mutual vulnerabilities induce general stability. If states were to accept MAD, their proclivities to use force as an instrument of foreign policy might decline significantly. That would have payoffs in the form of infrequent crises and increased cooperation between states. With nuclear weapons making superiority— whether conventional or nuclear—less decisive, powerful states are hamstrung in acting punitively against weaker states. In a fundamental difference from conventional wars, a state cannot achieve deterrence by denial by threatening to attack its enemy’s armed forces, given its adversary’s ability to achieve deterrence by punishment by retaliating. The archetypal example of this phenomenon is the nuclear-tinged rivalry between Washington and
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核印度与南亚升级格局的变化
核革命理论认为,核武器的破坏能力,加上可以轻易获得和获得相互的第二次打击能力,使相互的脆弱性成为不可否认的事实。这一现实使得在两个拥有核武器的国家之间的冲突中不可能取得军事胜利。因此,鉴于拥有可生存和安全的二次打击能力的国家的安全得到保证,维持现状更容易。根据这一理论,之所以会出现这种情况,是因为核武器减弱甚至消除了相当不稳定的安全困境,这种困境迄今已增加了对手和竞争者之间的不信任。对手的武器库规模或整体军事失衡变得无关紧要。此外,在相互保证毁灭(MAD)的条件下,核优势并不重要。总的来说,该理论认为核武器使国家更加安全。此外,通过消除对赢得一系列安全竞赛的追求,它们有助于使世界更安全。拥有核武器的国家将其他核国家看重的东西作为人质,这表明,相互的脆弱性会导致总体稳定。如果各国接受MAD,它们使用武力作为外交政策工具的倾向可能会显著下降。这将带来回报:危机不再频繁发生,国家间的合作也会增加。随着核武器的优势——无论是常规武器还是不那么具有决定性的核武器——强大的国家在对弱小国家采取惩罚性行动时受到了阻碍。与常规战争的根本区别是,一个国家不能通过威胁攻击敌人的武装力量来实现威慑,因为它的对手有能力通过报复的惩罚来实现威慑。这种现象的典型例子是华盛顿和伊朗之间的核竞争
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来源期刊
Nonproliferation Review
Nonproliferation Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
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