Ideal and Non-ideal Deliberation: The Problem of Equivocation

Abstract

I distinguish between ideal and non-ideal deliberation. I outline the relevance of both ideal and non-ideal theorising to show their respective roles and importance. This helps me to demonstrate that neither of them should be downplayed, confused with the other, or substituted. Although it appears more attractive to be an idealist than a non-idealist in a theoretical debate on social systems, I show that such a perception is practically inadequate. I then argue that when we deliberate, we presuppose either ideal or non-ideal deliberation. I demonstrate that it is consistent to stick to one deliberative presupposition in the same context, and I show that shifting from one deliberative presupposition to another in the same argument or context, is equivocation. I demonstrate how this kind of equivocation confuses and derails the debate. As a case study, I focus on the debate about consensual democracy in Africa. I seek in this essay to contribute lessons regarding the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theorising to the global project of deliberative democracy.