{"title":"Are the Fingerprints of WTO Staff on Panel Rulings a Problem? A Reply to Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc","authors":"Armin Steinbach","doi":"10.1093/ejil/chac031","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n By employing stylometric data analysis, Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc underpin the narrative of a power-mongering World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat. As ‘holder of the pen’ in writing WTO rulings, the Secretariat would absorb control over WTO adjudicators and the dispute settlement procedure. This reply disagrees. First, with stylometric analysis informing style rather than substance, this technique does not encrypt the intellectual ownership of WTO rulings, nor does it offer account of the deliberation between bureaucrats and adjudicators. Second, with public power typically deriving legitimacy from both political or judicial accountability as well as rational and de-politicized bureaucracies, an assertive WTO Secretariat under the direction of panellists is normatively desirable. Third, a WTO Secretariat pursuing consistent application of the growing WTO acquis does not impair the members-driven adjudication process.","PeriodicalId":47727,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of International Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of International Law","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chac031","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
By employing stylometric data analysis, Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc underpin the narrative of a power-mongering World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat. As ‘holder of the pen’ in writing WTO rulings, the Secretariat would absorb control over WTO adjudicators and the dispute settlement procedure. This reply disagrees. First, with stylometric analysis informing style rather than substance, this technique does not encrypt the intellectual ownership of WTO rulings, nor does it offer account of the deliberation between bureaucrats and adjudicators. Second, with public power typically deriving legitimacy from both political or judicial accountability as well as rational and de-politicized bureaucracies, an assertive WTO Secretariat under the direction of panellists is normatively desirable. Third, a WTO Secretariat pursuing consistent application of the growing WTO acquis does not impair the members-driven adjudication process.
期刊介绍:
The European Journal of International Law is firmly established as one of the world"s leading journals in its field. With its distinctive combination of theoretical and practical approaches to the issues of international law, the journal offers readers a unique opportunity to stay in touch with the latest developments in this rapidly evolving area. Each issue of the EJIL provides a forum for the exploration of the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of international law as well as for up-to-date analysis of topical issues. Additionally, it is the only journal to provide systematic coverage of the relationship between international law and the law of the European Union and its Member States.