Ethnic Exclusion, Armed Conflict, and Leader Survival

IF 0.1 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Korean Journal of International Studies Pub Date : 2017-12-31 DOI:10.14731/KJIS.2017.12.15.3.327
H. Choi
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Abstract

Why do some leaders pursue ethnic exclusion even though it increases the risk of ethnic conflict? This article develops and tests a theory that explains how a leader’s ethnic policy and the size of the minimum winning coalition interact to influence leader survival. An event history analysis of leadership duration between 1946 and 2012 shows that in non-democratic countries with small winning coalitions: (1) leaders who promote ethnic exclusion are more likely to survive longer in office than those who do not promote such policy; (2) leaders are more likely to be removed from office in a violent manner (e.g. coup d’état) when they fail to employ ethnic exclusion; and (3) political benefits from ethnic exclusion are large enough to offset the risk of being involved in civil war. These findings suggest that ethnic exclusion can be a rational strategy for autocratic leaders even if it might increase the risk of civil war. Political reforms without considering this grim reality are likely to introduce another source of violence and instability in autocratic regimes. He shows that Chewa-Tumbuka cleavage is highly salient in Malawi but not in a neighboring Zambia because Chewas and Tumbukas are large enough to serve as viable coalitions in Malawi but are too small to constitute such coalitions in Zambia.
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种族排斥、武装冲突和领袖生存
为什么有些领导人追求种族排斥,即使它增加了种族冲突的风险?本文发展并检验了一个理论,该理论解释了领导人的民族政策和最小获胜联盟的规模如何相互作用,影响领导人的生存。对1946年至2012年领导任期的事件历史分析表明,在非民主国家,拥有小型获胜联盟的领导人:(1)推行种族排斥政策的领导人比不推行种族排斥政策的领导人更有可能在任更长时间;(2)当领导人未能采用种族排斥时,他们更有可能以暴力方式(例如,政变)被免职;(3)种族排斥带来的政治利益大到足以抵消卷入内战的风险。这些发现表明,对专制领导人来说,种族排斥可能是一种理性的策略,即使它可能增加内战的风险。不考虑这一严峻现实的政治改革很可能在专制政权中引入另一个暴力和不稳定的根源。他指出,Chewa-Tumbuka的分裂在马拉维非常明显,但在邻国赞比亚却不是这样,因为chewa和tumbuka在马拉维足够大,可以作为可行的联盟,但在赞比亚太小,无法构成这样的联盟。
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来源期刊
Korean Journal of International Studies
Korean Journal of International Studies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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