Crisis y fragilidad financiera griega bajo la hipótesis de inestabilidad de Minsky

Abstract

Greece has still not found its way back while its economy has been deteriorating year after year since 2008. It is argued in this article that the central factor of this outcome was the dynamics of financing in the countries most involved in Greek indebtedness that was considerably greater and had a more detrimental influence on the Greek economy than poor fiscal management that different governments could incur. The impetus displayed by financial services did not correspond to the weakness of the real sector which occurs when borrowing and financial flows are used without restriction to meet the interests of creditors. In this work an analysis of the channels that fueled Greek debt is carried out in the context proposed by Minsky where an economy moves from financial stability to a scenario of instability supported in two determining variables: high and exaggerated interest on debt service and the type of agents holding debt assets. The debt-service interest incurred by the government since joining the eurozone and the impetus for financing caused the debt to have a giant snowball effect while the change in debt holders forced the government to comply with strict and onerous government and macroeconomic reforms that directly impacted the ability of Greek governments to pay with negative results on the well-being of society.