{"title":"The Transformation of the Economic and Monetary Union: Solidarity, Stability, and the Limits of Judicial Authority","authors":"J. Lindeboom","doi":"10.1017/S1574019621000444","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"On Thursday, 11 February 2010, the political leaders of the EU initiated what would turn out to be no less than a constitutional transformation of the Economic and Monetary Union. They declared their joint commitment to the financial stability of the Eurozone and the Union.1 This commitment upgraded the currency union’s central focus on price stability, dating from the Treaty of Maastricht. More fundamentally, however, this transformation brought about a normative change from a currency union based on negative solidarity to one based on positive solidarity between member states. Or so argues Vestert Borger in his The Currency of Solidarity, based on the author’s PhD thesis at Leiden University. When the European Court of Justice had to rule on the legality of the key manifestations of this transformation in Pringle2 and Gauweiler,3 Borger contends, it had no choice but to approve. The constitutional change of the Economic and","PeriodicalId":45815,"journal":{"name":"European Constitutional Law Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"753 - 773"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Constitutional Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019621000444","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
On Thursday, 11 February 2010, the political leaders of the EU initiated what would turn out to be no less than a constitutional transformation of the Economic and Monetary Union. They declared their joint commitment to the financial stability of the Eurozone and the Union.1 This commitment upgraded the currency union’s central focus on price stability, dating from the Treaty of Maastricht. More fundamentally, however, this transformation brought about a normative change from a currency union based on negative solidarity to one based on positive solidarity between member states. Or so argues Vestert Borger in his The Currency of Solidarity, based on the author’s PhD thesis at Leiden University. When the European Court of Justice had to rule on the legality of the key manifestations of this transformation in Pringle2 and Gauweiler,3 Borger contends, it had no choice but to approve. The constitutional change of the Economic and
期刊介绍：
The European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst), a peer reviewed English language journal, is a platform for advancing the study of European constitutional law, its history and evolution. Its scope is European law and constitutional law, history and theory, comparative law and jurisprudence. Published triannually, it contains articles on doctrine, scholarship and history, plus jurisprudence and book reviews. However, the premier issue includes more than twenty short articles by leading experts, each addressing a single topic in the Draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe. EuConst is addressed at academics, professionals, politicians and others involved or interested in the European constitutional process.
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