The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Financial Performance of Listed Companies: Evidence from Saudi Arabia

A. Aldaarmi
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Abstract

This study investigates the role of corporate governance regulations on the financial performance within listed companies in Saudi Arabia. 120 organisations were selected from Saudi Stock Exchange, Tadawul, over a period of four years between 2016 to 2019 for 565 observations. The data were gathered about the intendent variable of board independence, board size, board meeting, board interlocking, in addition to firm size and leverage as moderators. The independent variable was Tobin’s q. The result of this study shows that there is a negative relationship between board size and board interlocking on one hand and financial performance of the listed companies on the other hand. Other independent variables of independent directorships and frequency of board meeting were shown to have a positive effect on financial performance. The outcome of this study supports the theoretical foundations of stakeholder theory about the importance of reducing the monopoly of the agents (directors on board) over the decisions of the company. Such reduction of the effect of directors can be done through maximising the number of meetings accompanied by maximising the number of independent directors on board. Also, by reducing board interlocking, the influence of directors will shrink while increasing board size will slow down the process of taking decisions which affect companies’ performance.
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公司治理对上市公司财务绩效的影响:来自沙特阿拉伯的证据
本研究调查了公司治理法规对沙特阿拉伯上市公司财务绩效的作用。在2016年至2019年的四年时间里,从沙特证券交易所(Tadawul)选择了120家组织,进行了565次观察。数据收集了董事会独立性、董事会规模、董事会会议、董事会联锁等因变量,以及公司规模和杠杆率作为调节因子。自变量为Tobin’s q。本研究的结果表明,董事会规模和董事会连锁与上市公司的财务绩效之间存在负相关关系。独立董事和董事会会议频率等其他自变量对财务绩效有正向影响。本研究的结果支持了利益相关者理论的理论基础,即减少代理(董事会董事)对公司决策的垄断的重要性。减少董事的影响可以通过最大限度地增加会议次数,同时最大限度地增加独立董事的人数来实现。此外,通过减少董事会联锁,董事的影响力将会缩小,而增加董事会规模将减缓影响公司业绩的决策过程。
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发文量
48
审稿时长
6 weeks
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