Cobb–Douglas R&D production function, appropriability and opportunity: effects on R&D, technological progress and knowledge sharing

IF 3.2 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Economics of Innovation and New Technology Pub Date : 2022-05-13 DOI:10.1080/10438599.2022.2072307
Mário A. P. M. da Silva
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Abstract

ABSTRACT We consider a Cobb–Douglas production function with two firm-specific R&D resource inputs and specify the conditions under which higher knowledge spillovers cause higher technological progress in the industry. We then consider the exponential R&D production function and establish sufficient conditions for per-firm own R&D expenditures to be an increasing function of knowledge spillovers and technological opportunities. Knowledge spillovers and technological possibilities encourage R&D spending if firms’ decisions on R&D investments are strategic complements. We consider two identical firms that, prior to competition in the product market, first decide whether to reveal their R&D efforts to the other firm and second conduct cost-reducing or demand-enhancing R&D and examine the conditions under which full revelation of R&D efforts to rivals yields higher profits. Trigger strategies which require non-cooperative firms to share their R&D inputs will ensure the efficient sharing of R&D efforts. This model has new policy implications about the effects of knowledge spillovers and complementarity in R&D on the incentives to innovate and promote welfare. We present an intellectual property policy that challenges the traditional model of intellectual property as exclusive ownership rights.
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柯布-道格拉斯R&D生产函数、适宜性和机会:对R&D、技术进步和知识共享的影响
摘要:我们考虑了具有两个企业特定研发资源投入的Cobb–Douglas生产函数,并指定了更高的知识溢出导致行业技术进步的条件。然后,我们考虑了指数型研发生产函数,并为每个企业自己的研发支出建立了充分的条件,使其成为知识溢出和技术机会的增加函数。如果企业对研发投资的决策是战略补充,那么知识溢出和技术可能性会鼓励研发支出。我们考虑两个相同的公司,它们在产品市场竞争之前,首先决定是向另一家公司透露自己的研发努力,其次进行降低成本还是提高需求的研发,并考察向竞争对手充分透露研发努力产生更高利润的条件。要求非合作企业分享其研发投入的触发策略将确保研发努力的有效共享。该模型对研发中的知识溢出和互补性对创新和促进福利的激励机制的影响具有新的政策含义。我们提出了一项知识产权政策,挑战知识产权作为排他性所有权的传统模式。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.20
自引率
3.00%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: Economics of Innovation and New Technology is devoted to the theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants and effects of innovation, new technology and technological knowledge. The journal aims to provide a bridge between different strands of literature and different contributions of economic theory and empirical economics. This bridge is built in two ways. First, by encouraging empirical research (including case studies, econometric work and historical research), evaluating existing economic theory, and suggesting appropriate directions for future effort in theoretical work. Second, by exploring ways of applying and testing existing areas of theory to the economics of innovation and new technology, and ways of using theoretical insights to inform data collection and other empirical research. The journal welcomes contributions across a wide range of issues concerned with innovation, including: the generation of new technological knowledge, innovation in product markets, process innovation, patenting, adoption, diffusion, innovation and technology policy, international competitiveness, standardization and network externalities, innovation and growth, technology transfer, innovation and market structure, innovation and the environment, and across a broad range of economic activity not just in ‘high technology’ areas. The journal is open to a variety of methodological approaches ranging from case studies to econometric exercises with sound theoretical modelling, empirical evidence both longitudinal and cross-sectional about technologies, regions, firms, industries and countries.
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