J. Godinez, Rodrigo Bandeira de Mello, Luis Javier Sanchez-Barrios, M. Khalik
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引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract We analyze how the choice of firm ownership structure mitigates the effect of high dependence on a corrupt host government when investing abroad. We draw on a unique dataset of subsidiary-level engagement in corruption of 175 foreign subsidiaries entering three Central American countries. We found that there are two mechanisms to mitigate corrupt behavior when a subsidiary is dependent on a corrupt host government: internal legitimacy that accrues to wholly-owned subsidiaries, and external legitimacy built through a strong regional presence. The effect of dependency on a corrupt host government can be mitigated by enacting internal and external legitimacies.
期刊介绍：
Latin American Business Review is a quarterly, refereed journal which facilitates the exchange of information and new ideas between academics, business practitioners, public policymakers, and those in the international development community. Special features of the journal will keep you current on various teaching, research, and information sources. These activities all focus on the business and economic environment of the diverse and dynamic countries of the Americas.
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