{"title":"Confucian freedom: assessing the debate","authors":"R. Carleo","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so?","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"211 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"ASIAN STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
ABSTRACT What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so?
期刊介绍：
Asian Philosophy is an international journal concerned with such philosophical traditions as Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist and Islamic. The purpose of the journal is to bring these rich and varied traditions to a worldwide academic audience. It publishes articles in the central philosophical areas of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, logic, moral and social philosophy, as well as in applied philosophical areas such as aesthetics and jurisprudence. It also publishes articles comparing Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.
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