REPUTATION CONCERNS AND AUTHORITY IN ORGANIZATIONS

IF 0.2 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI:10.15057/28956
Doyoung Kim
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Abstract

The paper studies the optimal allocation of authority in an organization where an agent, who has reputation concerns, strategically transmits his information to the principal. The optimal allocation of authority allows its holder to use more and better information in order to make efficient decisions. The paperidenti fies the mechanism through which the agentʼs reputation concerns affect his information transmission. It shows that under centralization the agent transmits his information truthfully to the principal only if his reputation concerns are low and therefore that the delegation of authority to the agent can be optimal if the agentʼs reputation concerns are high.
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组织中的声誉和权威
本文研究了一个组织中的权力最优分配问题,其中代理人出于声誉考虑,战略性地将其信息传递给委托人。权力的最佳分配使其持有者能够使用更多更好的信息,以便做出有效的决策。本文确定了代理人的声誉问题影响其信息传递的机制。研究表明,在集中化条件下,只有当代理人的声誉问题较低时,代理人才会将其信息真实地传达给委托人,因此,如果代理人的声誉担忧较高,则向代理人授权可能是最优的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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