Gadamer and Aristotle. Problems of a Hermeneutic Appropriation

Abstract

ABSTRACT When Gadamer elaborates his conception of philosophical hermeneutics as a transcendental inquiry, he appeals to Aristotle’s practical philosophy as a “model”, which can elucidate his own conceptualization of understanding as intrinsically bound to the specific circumstances of every interpretation. The explicit formulation of the analogy between Aristotelian ethics and philosophical hermeneutics provides a framework that clarifies Gadamer’s principal intention; it also reveals some of the crucial tensions inherent in the Aristotelian conception of practical philosophy and its relation to praxis and phronêsis. In the 1970s, however, Gadamer suggests a practical transformation of hermeneutics, claiming for it the role of an “heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy”. Against Gadamer’s late “turn”, construed as a deviation from the initial analogy, I defend Aristotle’s practical philosophy as an exemplary model for philosophical hermeneutics, but I also maintain that the two projects pursue distinct epistemic goals.