When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems?

IF 1.4 3区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-03-13 DOI:10.1111/lsq.12419
Andrés Dockendorff, Simón Lodato
{"title":"When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems?","authors":"Andrés Dockendorff,&nbsp;Simón Lodato","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12419","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (<i>Gatekeeping Hypothesis</i>). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive's exclusive sphere (<i>Legislative Activity Hypothesis</i>). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6479 lobbying audiences and over 2300 bills.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12419","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsq.12419","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (Gatekeeping Hypothesis). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive's exclusive sphere (Legislative Activity Hypothesis). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6479 lobbying audiences and over 2300 bills.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
利益集团何时在强有力的总统制度中游说立法者?
在强势总统制下,利益集团何时会以立法者为目标进行接触或游说?本文探讨了两个假设。首先,利益集团和游说者会寻求接触拥有把关权力的委员会主席,即使在行政部门拥有(大部分)发起立法专属权的司法管辖区也是如此(把关假说)。其次,利益集团和游说者的目标是那些就与其相关的问题提出更多议案的立法者,但这些议案只涉及行政部门专属领域之外的政策领域(立法活动假说)。我们利用智利众议院的证据来验证这些假设。我们对 6479 名游说对象和 2300 多项议案进行了编码和分析。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Legislative Studies Quarterly
Legislative Studies Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
13.30%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: The Legislative Studies Quarterly is an international journal devoted to the publication of research on representative assemblies. Its purpose is to disseminate scholarly work on parliaments and legislatures, their relations to other political institutions, their functions in the political system, and the activities of their members both within the institution and outside. Contributions are invited from scholars in all countries. The pages of the Quarterly are open to all research approaches consistent with the normal canons of scholarship, and to work on representative assemblies in all settings and all time periods. The aim of the journal is to contribute to the formulation and verification of general theories about legislative systems, processes, and behavior.
期刊最新文献
Issue Information About the Authors Personality and political representation—How personality traits shape MPs' attitudes toward gender equality The role of politicians' perceptual accuracy of voter opinions in their electoral career Who works with whom? Collaboration ties in legislative policy‐making networks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1