{"title":"University-Affiliated Research Centers: evasive entrepreneurship within the DOD","authors":"Chandler S. Reilly","doi":"10.1108/jepp-01-2022-0012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"PurposeThe Department of Defense (DOD) has long partnered with universities and other nonprofit organizations to perform early-stage, military-related research using research centers established under long-term contracts known as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). Over the last 25 years, there has been a shift in the type of arrangement used to University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) that this paper argues is the result of bureaucrats acting as evasive entrepreneurs in response to changing regulations.Design/methodology/approachExtending the theory of evasive entrepreneurship to bureaucrats, the author shows how regulations increase the cost of bureaucratic action and incentivize the creation of substitute actions to avoid those regulatory costs and capture benefits. Qualitative evidence from DOD documents is used to support the contention that UARCs serve the same function as FFRDCs. Quantitative evidence on the number of FFRDCs and UARCs and their funding illustrates how bureaucrats respond to political restrictions.FindingsBureaucrats have little to no recourse to respond to budgetary cuts or spending ceilings. In the case of FFRDCs, spending ceilings were introduced starting in the 1960s and led to a decline in the number of DOD FFRDCs. Bureaucrats can however strategically evade new regulations by reorganizing transactions justified by existing federal law that contradicts new regulations. Once FFRDCs were federally regulated in 1990 there were strong incentives to create substitute arrangements leading to the creation of UARCs in 1996 that have ultimately replaced FFRDCs as the research center of choice for the DOD.Originality/valueThe article makes three contributions. First, it applies the concept of evasive entrepreneurship to a political context and then use that framework to understand the creation and establishment of the DOD's UARCS. Second, the organizational features and purpose of UARCs are analyzed. Third, the evidence provided shows how regulations resulted in a shift in the DOD's R&D strategy toward working with universities.","PeriodicalId":44503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/jepp-01-2022-0012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
PurposeThe Department of Defense (DOD) has long partnered with universities and other nonprofit organizations to perform early-stage, military-related research using research centers established under long-term contracts known as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). Over the last 25 years, there has been a shift in the type of arrangement used to University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) that this paper argues is the result of bureaucrats acting as evasive entrepreneurs in response to changing regulations.Design/methodology/approachExtending the theory of evasive entrepreneurship to bureaucrats, the author shows how regulations increase the cost of bureaucratic action and incentivize the creation of substitute actions to avoid those regulatory costs and capture benefits. Qualitative evidence from DOD documents is used to support the contention that UARCs serve the same function as FFRDCs. Quantitative evidence on the number of FFRDCs and UARCs and their funding illustrates how bureaucrats respond to political restrictions.FindingsBureaucrats have little to no recourse to respond to budgetary cuts or spending ceilings. In the case of FFRDCs, spending ceilings were introduced starting in the 1960s and led to a decline in the number of DOD FFRDCs. Bureaucrats can however strategically evade new regulations by reorganizing transactions justified by existing federal law that contradicts new regulations. Once FFRDCs were federally regulated in 1990 there were strong incentives to create substitute arrangements leading to the creation of UARCs in 1996 that have ultimately replaced FFRDCs as the research center of choice for the DOD.Originality/valueThe article makes three contributions. First, it applies the concept of evasive entrepreneurship to a political context and then use that framework to understand the creation and establishment of the DOD's UARCS. Second, the organizational features and purpose of UARCs are analyzed. Third, the evidence provided shows how regulations resulted in a shift in the DOD's R&D strategy toward working with universities.
期刊介绍:
Institutions – especially public policies – are a significant determinant of economic outcomes; entrepreneurship and enterprise development are often the channel by which public policies affect economic outcomes, and by which outcomes feed back to the policy process. The Journal of Entrepreneurship & Public Policy (JEPP) was created to encourage and disseminate quality research about these vital relationships. The ultimate aim is to improve the quality of the political discourse about entrepreneurship and development policies. JEPP publishes two issues per year and welcomes: Empirically oriented academic papers and accepts a wide variety of empirical evidence. Generally, the journal considers any analysis based on real-world circumstances and conditions that can change behaviour, legislation, or outcomes, Conceptual or theoretical papers that indicate a direction for future research, or otherwise advance the field of study, A limited number of carefully and accurately executed replication studies, Book reviews. In general, JEPP seeks high-quality articles that say something interesting about the relationships among public policy and entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship and economic development, or all three areas. Scope/Coverage: Entrepreneurship, Public policy, Public policies and behaviour of economic agents, Interjurisdictional differentials and their effects, Law and entrepreneurship, New firms; startups, Microeconomic analyses of economic development, Development planning and policy, Innovation and invention: processes and incentives, Regional economic activity: growth, development, and changes, Regional development policy.