{"title":"Impact of pay disparities between chief executive officers and chief financial officers on corporate financial and investment policies","authors":"Feng Han, Xin Che, Enya He","doi":"10.1111/jifm.12142","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study whether and how pay disparities between chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) affect corporate policies. Consistent with the tournament theory, we find a positive association between the CEO–CFO pay disparity and aggressiveness in corporate financial and investment policies. Specifically, a firm with a large CEO–CFO pay disparity tends to have an aggressive capital structure and tilt toward high-risk investments. Furthermore, we test the impact of the CEO–CFO pay disparity on firm value and show that the pay disparity is positively associated with firm value. Overall, we conclude that CEO–CFO pay disparities provide CFOs with tournament incentives to not only adopt aggressive corporate policies but also select better investment projects. Our research highlights the career-enhancing and value-creating effects of CEO–CFO pay disparities as well as the important role of CFOs’ incentives on the treasurer side of their duties.</p>","PeriodicalId":46659,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jifm.12142","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jifm.12142","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
We study whether and how pay disparities between chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) affect corporate policies. Consistent with the tournament theory, we find a positive association between the CEO–CFO pay disparity and aggressiveness in corporate financial and investment policies. Specifically, a firm with a large CEO–CFO pay disparity tends to have an aggressive capital structure and tilt toward high-risk investments. Furthermore, we test the impact of the CEO–CFO pay disparity on firm value and show that the pay disparity is positively associated with firm value. Overall, we conclude that CEO–CFO pay disparities provide CFOs with tournament incentives to not only adopt aggressive corporate policies but also select better investment projects. Our research highlights the career-enhancing and value-creating effects of CEO–CFO pay disparities as well as the important role of CFOs’ incentives on the treasurer side of their duties.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting publishes original research dealing with international aspects of financial management and reporting, banking and financial services, auditing and taxation. Providing a forum for the interaction of ideas from both academics and practitioners, the JIFMA keeps you up-to-date with new developments and emerging trends.