{"title":"Two Ways of Completing the European Fundamental Rights Union: Amendment to vs. Reinterpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights","authors":"A. Jakab, Lando Kirchmair","doi":"10.1017/cel.2022.5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this Article is to show that the enforcement of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) values vis-à-vis Member States could benefit from the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’) also in instances where the current interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR prevents this. This would be the case if the CFR were also applicable to purely domestic cases, eg—but not only—with regard to fundamental rights-relevant violations related to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In this case, the European Court of Justice, which has already partly taken this path recently, could prevent the violation of core EU values. The most important historical challenge to those values in Europe today is the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and democracy in certain Member States. It is the very purpose of fundamental rights to provide answers to such dangers. When one speaks of the rule of law and democracy, one necessarily also means fundamental rights. This Article thus advocates an EU which perceives itself as a complete fundamental rights union. While the traditional interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR had a balanced division of competence between the EU and its Member States in mind, the disregard of Article 2 TEU values triggers a clausula rebus sic stantibus: the neat federal balance can only be upheld if both ends stick to the original promise made. It demonstrates two ways of completing the European fundamental rights union: treaty revision, on the one hand, and reinterpretation of Article 51 CFR, on the other hand. Both ways have in common that only a complete fundamental rights union can establish a system of fundamental rights protection that is uniform and thus equality-preserving in cases where national fundamental rights fail to provide sufficient protection.","PeriodicalId":52109,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies","volume":"24 1","pages":"239 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2022.5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract The aim of this Article is to show that the enforcement of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) values vis-à-vis Member States could benefit from the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’) also in instances where the current interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR prevents this. This would be the case if the CFR were also applicable to purely domestic cases, eg—but not only—with regard to fundamental rights-relevant violations related to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In this case, the European Court of Justice, which has already partly taken this path recently, could prevent the violation of core EU values. The most important historical challenge to those values in Europe today is the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and democracy in certain Member States. It is the very purpose of fundamental rights to provide answers to such dangers. When one speaks of the rule of law and democracy, one necessarily also means fundamental rights. This Article thus advocates an EU which perceives itself as a complete fundamental rights union. While the traditional interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR had a balanced division of competence between the EU and its Member States in mind, the disregard of Article 2 TEU values triggers a clausula rebus sic stantibus: the neat federal balance can only be upheld if both ends stick to the original promise made. It demonstrates two ways of completing the European fundamental rights union: treaty revision, on the one hand, and reinterpretation of Article 51 CFR, on the other hand. Both ways have in common that only a complete fundamental rights union can establish a system of fundamental rights protection that is uniform and thus equality-preserving in cases where national fundamental rights fail to provide sufficient protection.
本文的目的是表明,在执行《欧洲联盟条约》(“TEU”)第2条的价值观-à-vis时,成员国也可以从《欧盟基本权利宪章》(“CFR”)的适用中受益,即使目前对《欧盟基本权利宪章》第51(1)条的解释阻止了这一点。如果CFR也适用于纯粹的国内案件,例如——但不仅仅是——与基本权利有关的违反第2条TEU所载价值观的案件,情况就是如此。在这种情况下,欧洲法院(European Court of Justice)——最近已经在一定程度上采取了这条道路——可能会阻止违反欧盟核心价值观的行为。今天欧洲对这些价值观的最重要的历史性挑战是在某些会员国有系统地瓦解法治和民主。为这些危险提供答案,正是基本权利的目的所在。当谈到法治和民主时,也必然意味着基本权利。因此,本文主张建立一个将自己视为一个完整的基本权利联盟的欧盟。虽然对第51(1)条CFR的传统解释在欧盟及其成员国之间考虑了平衡的权限划分,但无视第2条TEU价值引发了一个条款的重新定义:只有当双方都坚持最初的承诺时,才能维持联邦的平衡。它展示了完成欧洲基本权利联盟的两种方式:一方面是条约修订,另一方面是对《联邦法典》第51条的重新解释。这两种方式的共同之处在于,只有一个完整的基本权利联盟,才能在国家基本权利无法提供充分保护的情况下,建立统一的、保持平等的基本权利保护制度。
期刊介绍:
The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (CYELS) offers authors and readers a space for sustained reflection and conversation about the challenges facing Europe and the diverse legal contexts in which those challenges are addressed. It identifies European Legal Studies as a broad field of legal enquiry encompassing not only European Union law but also the law emanating from the Council of Europe; comparative European public and private law; and national law in its interaction with European legal sources. The Yearbook is a publication of the Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge.