Excessive prices: a new analytical approach

Q2 Social Sciences European Competition Journal Pub Date : 2020-11-21 DOI:10.1080/17441056.2020.1839227
Walid Gani
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT Proving the excessiveness of the dominant firm's prices constitutes a challenging task for young competition authorities, due to the difficulties in confronting economic theories with facts and the lack of analytical tools to carry out robust investigations. To handle these issues, this paper proposes a statistical algorithm centred on the analysis of the prices and mark-up of the dominant firm. An empirical study involving the use of real industrial data is carried out to show the implementation of the proposed statistical algorithm. The results reveal that the excessiveness of the dominant firm's prices is due to the excessiveness of its mark-up over the total cost. Our findings also show that the pricing behaviour of the dominant firm remains unpredictable in the absence of a large amount of data for the analysis of demand patterns, a direct measurement of the marginal cost, and a good knowledge of market functioning.
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价格过高:一种新的分析方法
摘要对年轻的竞争主管部门来说,证明占主导地位的企业价格过高是一项具有挑战性的任务,因为他们很难将经济理论与事实相结合,也缺乏进行有力调查的分析工具。为了解决这些问题,本文提出了一种以分析主导企业的价格和加价为中心的统计算法。对实际工业数据的使用进行了实证研究,以展示所提出的统计算法的实现。结果表明,占主导地位的企业的价格过高是由于其加价超过了总成本。我们的研究结果还表明,在缺乏大量数据来分析需求模式、直接衡量边际成本以及对市场运作有充分了解的情况下,占主导地位的公司的定价行为仍然是不可预测的。
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来源期刊
European Competition Journal
European Competition Journal Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
12
期刊介绍: The European Competition Journal publishes outstanding scholarly articles relating to European competition law and economics. Its mission is to help foster learning and debate about how European competition law and policy can continue to develop in an economically rational way. Articles published in the Journal are subject to rigorous peer review by leading experts from around Europe. Topics include: -Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers -Enlargement of the Union - the ramifications for Competition Policy -Unilateral and Coordinated Effects in Merger Control -Modernisation of European Competition law -Cartels and Leniency.
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