Governance edging out representation? Explaining the imbalanced functions of China’s people’s congress system

IF 2.4 3区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Journal of Chinese Governance Pub Date : 2020-04-25 DOI:10.1080/23812346.2020.1748836
Xuedong Yang, Jian Yan
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Abstract In theory, representation is the primary function of the people’s congresses. In practice, under China’s party-state system, the ruling party imposes specific governance tasks on the congresses with the effect that the representative function of the People’s Congress System has largely given way to its governance functions. The uneven practice of these functions has left the System facing a serious representation deficit. Based on a careful analysis of historical archives and findings from interviews and observations, this paper examines the causes and repercussions of the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System. By proposing a Monitoring and Adaptation Model, we adopt a historical perspective to reexamine the interplay between the people’s congresses and the ruling party, arguing that the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System result from the interplay between Party monitoring and the corresponding adaptations of the people’s congresses. The Party, to bolster its governing performance, has introduced an array of institutional arrangements to have the people’s congresses fulfill specific governance tasks. However, the people’s congresses have gained a measure of autonomy thanks to their organizational growth and institutionalization, changes to the makeup of deputies, and significant efforts by certain leaders since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Although they are expected to take on the governance functions assigned by the ruling party, the people’s congresses thus enjoy greater leeway to carry out their functions selectively with an eye to improving their standing and relevance in China’s political system. Ironically, the fact that the people’s congresses prioritize their governance functions and that the overall performance of the party-state system gains consistent improvement may have warded off a potential representation crisis as the weak representativeness of the People’s Congress System would otherwise predict. Abbreviations: PCS: The People's Congress System; CPC: The Communist Party of China; The “M&A model”: The Monitoring and Adaptation Model; NPC: National People's Congress; LPCs: Local People's Congresses; CPPCC: The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
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治理超越了代表性?解读中国人民代表大会制度功能失衡
摘要从理论上讲,代表权是人民代表大会的首要职能。在实践中,在中国的党-国家制度下,执政党将具体的治理任务强加给代表大会,人民代表大会制度的代表职能在很大程度上被其治理职能所取代。这些职能的不均衡实践使联合国系统面临严重的代表性不足。本文在仔细分析历史档案以及访谈和观察结果的基础上,探讨了人民代表大会制度功能失衡的原因和影响。通过提出监督和适应模式,我们从历史的角度重新审视了人民代表大会和执政党之间的相互作用,认为人民代表大会制度的功能失衡是党的监督和人民代表大会相应适应之间相互作用的结果。为了提高党的执政水平,党出台了一系列让人大履行具体执政任务的制度安排。然而,由于人民代表大会的组织发展和制度化,代表组成的变化,以及文化大革命结束以来某些领导人的重大努力,人民代表大会获得了一定程度的自主权。尽管人们期望人民代表大会承担执政党赋予的治理职能,但人民代表大会因此有更大的余地选择性地履行其职能,以提高其在中国政治体系中的地位和相关性。具有讽刺意味的是,人民代表大会优先考虑其治理职能,党和国家制度的整体表现不断改善,这一事实可能避免了潜在的代表性危机,否则人民代表大会制度的代表性较弱就会预测到这一点。缩写:PCS:人民代表大会制度;CPC:中国共产党;“并购模式”:监测和适应模式;全国人民代表大会;LPCs:地方人民代表大会;中国人民政治协商会议
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
6.70%
发文量
9
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