Founding Authority: Authority, the Authoritative, and John Marshall's McCulloch

Simon Gilhooley
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Abstract

Abstract Lacking the powers of the “purse or the sword,” the U.S. Supreme Court is particularly dependent upon maintaining “authority” in order to ensure recognition of its constitutional rulings. Such authority allows the Court to operate against the majority and to survive as a political institution despite lacking a basis in popular will. In one understanding of the Court's position, that authority sits outside of politics, and calls upon a pre-existing and accepted relationship in order to navigate the absence of power and force. Linking authority to a pre-existing relationship and a non-political role, the Supreme Court can be seen as countermajoritarian by design. Calling on an authority which sits outside of political life, by necessity it lacks attachment to the political majority of any given era, and instead binds the nation to a constitution which sits above and beyond politics. However a second approach to authority emphasizes not a relationship to a past moment or pre-political relationship but rather the collective recognition of authority. This view of authority looks to Flathman's conception of “the authoritative,” defined in terms of “the web of conventions” that link power and authority, to situate authority within the current moment. Examining a central moment within the development of the U.S. Supreme Court's authority, the case of McCulloch vs. Maryland, this article argues that it is the second view of authority that most readily captures the authority of the Court. Through a close reading of Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch vs. Maryland, the article shows that while appeals to a founding moment were important within that opinion, these appeals can be productively understood as reflective of the authoritative ethos of the early American Republic. Framed in this manner, the opinion sought to generate authority not by a link to the past but through connection to a contingent sense of the authoritative. Crucially, such an approach positions constitutional authority within the contemporary political realm and offers the possibility of a constitutional politics less anchored in a particular historical moment of founding.
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创始权威:权威、权威和约翰·马歇尔的麦卡洛克
摘要由于缺乏“钱包或剑”的权力,美国最高法院特别依赖于维持“权威”,以确保其宪法裁决得到承认。这种权力使法院能够反对多数人,并作为一个政治机构生存下来,尽管缺乏民意基础。在对最高法院立场的一种理解中,该权力不在政治之外,并呼吁建立一种预先存在和公认的关系,以应对权力和武力的缺失。将权力与预先存在的关系和非政治角色联系起来,最高法院可以被视为蓄意的反多数主义者。它呼吁一个政治生活之外的权威,必然会对任何特定时代的政治多数缺乏依恋,而是将国家约束在一部超越政治的宪法之下。然而,第二种权威方法强调的不是与过去时刻或政治前关系的关系,而是对权威的集体承认。这种权威观着眼于弗拉特曼的“权威”概念,即连接权力和权威的“惯例之网”,将权威置于当前时刻。本文考察了美国最高法院权力发展的一个核心时刻,即麦卡洛克诉马里兰州案,认为第二种权力观最容易抓住法院的权力。通过仔细阅读首席大法官约翰·马歇尔在麦卡洛克诉马里兰州案中的意见,文章表明,虽然对建国时刻的呼吁在该意见中很重要,但这些呼吁可以被有效地理解为反映了早期美国共和国的权威精神。以这种方式构建的观点,不是通过与过去的联系,而是通过与权威的偶然感的联系,试图产生权威。至关重要的是,这种方法将宪法权威定位于当代政治领域,并提供了一种宪法政治的可能性,这种政治不那么依赖于建国的特定历史时刻。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
6
审稿时长
18 weeks
期刊介绍: The British Journal of American Legal Studies is a scholarly journal which publishes articles of interest to the Anglo-American legal community. Submissions are invited from academics and practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic on all aspects of constitutional law having relevance to the United States, including human rights, legal and political theory, socio-legal studies and legal history. International, comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives are particularly welcome. All submissions will be peer-refereed through anonymous referee processes.
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