Ramsey's Lost Counterfactual

IF 0.7 3区 哲学 Q3 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE History and Philosophy of Logic Pub Date : 2022-09-19 DOI:10.1080/01445340.2022.2110011
Caterina Sisti
{"title":"Ramsey's Lost Counterfactual","authors":"Caterina Sisti","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2110011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In contemporary works on conditionals, the Ramsey test is a procedure for the evaluation of conditional sentences. There are several versions of the test, all inspired by a footnote by the British philosopher and mathematician Frank Ramsey, in his General Propositions and Causality. However, no study on Ramsey's own account of conditionals has been put forth so far. Furthermore, the footnote seems to cover indicative conditionals only, and this has led to the belief that no account of counterfactuals can be found in Ramsey's work. In this paper, I recover Ramsey's account of counterfactuals and show that it is sketched in the footnote too. The result is a well-developed account of counterfactuals that resembles many contemporary ones. But Ramsey uses the same approach also for other types of conditionals, and this casts doubts on the current criteria for the classification of this type of sentences.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"311 - 326"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History and Philosophy of Logic","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2110011","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

In contemporary works on conditionals, the Ramsey test is a procedure for the evaluation of conditional sentences. There are several versions of the test, all inspired by a footnote by the British philosopher and mathematician Frank Ramsey, in his General Propositions and Causality. However, no study on Ramsey's own account of conditionals has been put forth so far. Furthermore, the footnote seems to cover indicative conditionals only, and this has led to the belief that no account of counterfactuals can be found in Ramsey's work. In this paper, I recover Ramsey's account of counterfactuals and show that it is sketched in the footnote too. The result is a well-developed account of counterfactuals that resembles many contemporary ones. But Ramsey uses the same approach also for other types of conditionals, and this casts doubts on the current criteria for the classification of this type of sentences.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
拉姆齐的《迷失的反事实
在当代关于条件句的著作中,拉姆齐测试是一种评估条件句的程序。该测试有几个版本,所有版本的灵感都来自英国哲学家和数学家弗兰克·拉姆齐在其《一般命题与因果关系》中的脚注。然而,到目前为止,还没有关于拉姆齐自己对条件句的描述的研究。此外,脚注似乎只涵盖了指示性条件句,这导致人们相信在拉姆齐的作品中找不到对反事实的解释。在本文中,我恢复了拉姆齐对反事实的描述,并表明它在脚注中也有概述。其结果是对反事实的详尽描述,类似于许多当代的反事实。但拉姆齐对其他类型的条件句也使用了同样的方法,这让人们对目前这类句子的分类标准产生了怀疑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
History and Philosophy of Logic
History and Philosophy of Logic 综合性期刊-科学史与科学哲学
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: History and Philosophy of Logic contains articles, notes and book reviews dealing with the history and philosophy of logic. ’Logic’ is understood to be any volume of knowledge which was regarded as logic at the time in question. ’History’ refers back to ancient times and also to work in this century; however, the Editor will not accept articles, including review articles, on very recent work on a topic. ’Philosophy’ refers to broad and general questions: specialist articles which are now classed as ’philosophical logic’ will not be published. The Editor will consider articles on the relationship between logic and other branches of knowledge, but the component of logic must be substantial. Topics with no temporal specification are to be interpreted both historically and philosophically. Each topic includes its own metalogic where appropriate.
期刊最新文献
How Tarskian are Carnap's Semantics? Judgments vs Propositions in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Conception of Logic Buridan’s Theory of Consequences Following Bobzien: Some Notes on Frege's Development and Engagement with his Environment Denying Infinity: Pragmatism in Abraham Robinson’s Philosophy of Mathematics
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1