Are Moral Judgments About the Past a Necessity or Unethical? Reflections on the Meaning of Universalistic and Relativistic Ethical Positions

Abstract

ABSTRACT Ethical relations to the past demand a conscious confrontation of the past. In this sense we will examine the close connection between past events and moral concepts and their influence on current moral discourses. We presume a weak moral objectivism, since strong moral objectivism fails to take account of relevant particulars of a given context, now or in the past, and since it might carry a tendency to dogmatism and rigidity. A stringent moral relativism, on the other hand, can lead to the trivialisation and denial of the violation of universal ethical values. From a philosophical standpoint, it will be argued that moral judgments about past actions are appropriate and necessary, followed by reflections on the significance of universalist and relativist positions in social science discourses and from psychoanalytic social psychology.