Collective Action Problems in Chinese Takeover Rules: Deficiency and Difficulty in Protecting Target Shareholders in a Hybrid Regime

Abstract

China is in a process of upgrading its corporate law and corporate governance regime. The reform involves a learning process of incorporating corporate governance norms from other jurisdictions. In the field of takeover rules, China’s hybrid regime is a combination of some elements from both the US model and the UK model, reflecting China’s pragmatic approach towards rule of law and legislative reform. Though flexible and pragmatic, this transplant approach without taking into account China’s own economic, social and even political scenarios is of little help to address the agency problem embedded in China’s concentrated shareholding model faced by its SOEs and family–controlled enterprises let alone the shareholder protection rules investors are keen to have. A comparative study is conducted in this article to investigate the collective action problems the Chinse takeover rules fail to address. Autonomy of sport, Private International Law, Public-private Governance, Corruption, Transnational Legal Order, Sports Economy, Legal Status of Sporting Organisations, Audit, Managerial Transparency, Economic Monitoring, International Sporting Convention