Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Q2 Social Sciences Nonproliferation Review Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI:10.1080/10736700.2022.2093507
R. P. Rajagopalan
{"title":"Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi","authors":"R. P. Rajagopalan","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2093507","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In their essay “ Upsetting the Nuclear Order: How the Rise of Nationalist Populism Increases Nuclear Dangers, ” Oliver Meier and Maren Vieluf highlight some important aspects of nationalist-populists ’ decision-making styles and argue that they could lead to greater nuclear danger and undermine the global nuclear order. The authors also challenge the traditional notion of responsible and irresponsible nuclear-weapon states. These aspects of nationalist-populist leaders ’ in fl uence on nuclear decision making have not been studied in any detail before; the article thus represents an important con-tribution to the academic literature on nuclear decision making and nuclear danger. Despite its importance as a fi rst cut, there are a number of drawbacks in the argument. It is undoubtedly true that nationalist-populist leaders have shown a distinct attitude toward foreign and defense policies and choices. But whether this also impacts nuclear-weapons decision making is a bit more uncertain because that decision-making remains a signi fi cantly distinct arena for policy makers. More signi fi cantly, the choice of national-ist-populist leaders — former US President Donald Trump, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin — is questionable. That Chinese President Xi Jinping is not categorized as a nation-alist-populist leader is surprising. While there may not be an electoral process that keeps Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, Xi and the CCP appear conscious that the legitimacy of the party is maintained by the policies of Xi and his party. They have carefully used populism in pushing their policies, even if the manner in which Chinese public perceptions are managed may be di ff erent. Xi ’ s anti-corruption drive, for instance, was propelled primarily by careful use and nurturing of public anger. In foreign policy, the CCP has again carefully nurtured and managed public opinion to gain support for policy. The manner in which China responded to South Korea after the latter ’ s decision to deploy the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile-defense system is a case in point:","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"37 - 40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Nonproliferation Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2093507","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

In their essay “ Upsetting the Nuclear Order: How the Rise of Nationalist Populism Increases Nuclear Dangers, ” Oliver Meier and Maren Vieluf highlight some important aspects of nationalist-populists ’ decision-making styles and argue that they could lead to greater nuclear danger and undermine the global nuclear order. The authors also challenge the traditional notion of responsible and irresponsible nuclear-weapon states. These aspects of nationalist-populist leaders ’ in fl uence on nuclear decision making have not been studied in any detail before; the article thus represents an important con-tribution to the academic literature on nuclear decision making and nuclear danger. Despite its importance as a fi rst cut, there are a number of drawbacks in the argument. It is undoubtedly true that nationalist-populist leaders have shown a distinct attitude toward foreign and defense policies and choices. But whether this also impacts nuclear-weapons decision making is a bit more uncertain because that decision-making remains a signi fi cantly distinct arena for policy makers. More signi fi cantly, the choice of national-ist-populist leaders — former US President Donald Trump, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin — is questionable. That Chinese President Xi Jinping is not categorized as a nation-alist-populist leader is surprising. While there may not be an electoral process that keeps Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, Xi and the CCP appear conscious that the legitimacy of the party is maintained by the policies of Xi and his party. They have carefully used populism in pushing their policies, even if the manner in which Chinese public perceptions are managed may be di ff erent. Xi ’ s anti-corruption drive, for instance, was propelled primarily by careful use and nurturing of public anger. In foreign policy, the CCP has again carefully nurtured and managed public opinion to gain support for policy. The manner in which China responded to South Korea after the latter ’ s decision to deploy the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile-defense system is a case in point:
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan,新德里观察员研究基金会安全、战略和技术中心主任
Oliver Meier和Maren Vieluf在他们的文章《扰乱核秩序:民族民粹主义的兴起如何增加核危险》中强调了民族民粹主义决策风格的一些重要方面,并认为它们可能导致更大的核危险,破坏全球核秩序。作者还挑战了负责任和不负责任的核武器国家的传统观念。民族主义-民粹主义领导人对核决策的影响的这些方面以前没有被详细研究过;因此,这篇文章对核决策和核危险的学术文献作出了重要贡献。尽管它作为第一个削减很重要,但在这个论点中也有一些缺点。毫无疑问,民族主义-民粹主义领导人对外交和国防政策和选择表现出了鲜明的态度。但是,这是否也会影响核武器的决策还不太确定,因为对决策者来说,核武器的决策仍然是一个明显不同的领域。更重要的是,选择民族主义-民粹主义领导人——美国前总统唐纳德·特朗普、英国首相鲍里斯·约翰逊、印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪和俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京——是值得怀疑的。他们小心翼翼地利用民粹主义来推动自己的政策,尽管管理中国公众看法的方式可能有所不同。在外交政策上,中国共产党再次小心翼翼地培育和管理公众舆论,以获得对政策的支持。在韩国决定部署美国末段高空区域防御系统(THAAD,萨德)后,中国对韩国的反应就是一个很好的例子。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Nonproliferation Review
Nonproliferation Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
期刊最新文献
Poisonous affairs: Russia’s evolving use of poison in covert operations The evolution and future of Israeli nuclear ambiguity Who would trust a nuclear umbrella? Results from an original survey on public confidence in future nuclear guarantees in Morocco BWC assurance: increasing certainty in BWC compliance God isn’t dead: religion, nuclear norms, and the Middle East
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1