Elinor Ostrom on choice, collective action and rationality: a Senian analysis

IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Journal of Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-07 DOI:10.1017/s1744137423000255
Paul Lewis, Matias Petersen
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Abstract

This paper explores Elinor Ostrom's account of practical reason through the conceptual lens provided by a typology of dimensions of rational conduct advanced by Amartya Sen. On Sen's view, self-interested behaviour has three independent, and separable, features: self-centred welfare, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. We suggest that Ostrom is committed to a version of rational choice theory that retains the assumptions of self-welfare goal and self-goal choice but, by acknowledging that people's welfare is affected by factors beyond their material consumption, departs from the assumption of self-welfare goal. We argue that this departure is not necessarily driven by an acknowledgement, along Senian lines, that people may have reasons for action other than the single-minded pursuit of their own goals, but rather by Ostrom's belief that the decision problem people face is so complex that maximising behaviour is rendered impossible. We illustrate this argument by analysing how Elinor Ostrom's position differs not only from Sen's but also from that of her husband and long-time collaborator Vincent Ostrom, who in his analysis of the covenantal aspects of rule-making seems to depart from the assumptions of instrumental rationality and preference-satisfaction.
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埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆论选择、集体行动和理性:一个塞尼亚式的分析
本文通过阿马蒂亚·森(Amartya Sen)提出的理性行为维度类型学提供的概念视角,探讨了埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆(Elinor Ostrom)对实践理性的解释。在森的观点中,自利行为具有三个独立且可分离的特征:自我中心福利、自我福利目标和自我目标选择。我们认为,奥斯特罗姆致力于理性选择理论的一个版本,它保留了自我福利目标和自我目标选择的假设,但通过承认人们的福利受到物质消费以外的因素的影响,背离了自我福利目标的假设。我们认为,这种背离并不一定是因为人们承认,除了一心一意地追求自己的目标之外,人们可能有行动的理由,而是因为奥斯特罗姆认为,人们面临的决策问题是如此复杂,以至于行为最大化是不可能的。我们通过分析埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆的立场不仅与森的立场不同,而且与她的丈夫和长期合作伙伴文森特·奥斯特罗姆的立场不同来说明这一论点,文森特·奥斯特罗姆在分析规则制定的契约方面似乎偏离了工具理性和偏好满足的假设。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
18.20%
发文量
45
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