{"title":"Does CEO Power Affect the Association Between CEO Compensation and Tangible Assets Impairments?","authors":"K. Lee, Cheng-Few Lee, Gillian Yeo","doi":"10.1142/S0219091521500053","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment. We find that the level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the tangible long-lived assets impairment charges. We also document that in firms with CEOs who have more decision-making power, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is mitigated. Specifically, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is less pronounced (1) when CEO chairs the board, (2) when CEO is the founder of the firm, (3) when the CEO is involved in the director selection process, and (4) when overall board independence is low.","PeriodicalId":45653,"journal":{"name":"Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies","volume":"24 1","pages":"2150005"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219091521500053","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines the association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment. We find that the level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the tangible long-lived assets impairment charges. We also document that in firms with CEOs who have more decision-making power, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is mitigated. Specifically, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is less pronounced (1) when CEO chairs the board, (2) when CEO is the founder of the firm, (3) when the CEO is involved in the director selection process, and (4) when overall board independence is low.
期刊介绍：
This journal concentrates on global interdisciplinary research in finance, economics and accounting. The major topics include: 1. Business, economic and financial relations among the Pacific rim countries. 2. Financial markets and industries. 3. Options and futures markets of the United States and other Pacific rim countries. 4. International accounting issues related to U.S. companies investing in Pacific rim countries. 5. The issue of and strategy for developing Tokyo, Taipei, Shanghai, Sydney, Seoul, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila as international or regional financial centers. 6. Global monetary and foreign exchange policy, and 7. Other high quality interdisciplinary research in global accounting, business, economics and finance.
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