Trade Competitiveness, Constituency Interests, and Legislators' Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements

Abstract

We argue that legislators’ trade attitudes reflect constituents’ economic interests. Concretely, we expect that legislators from districts that are highly competitive in international trade should be more supportive of trade agreements than legislators from noncompetitive districts. The strength of this relationship should be lower in multimember districts and for right-wing legislators. Data based on surveys with 3,576 legislators from 16 Latin American countries and 48 legislative periods between 2005 and 2019 allow us to test these expectations. The surveys captured legislators’ attitudes towards trade agreements between their countries and the United States and the European Union, respectively, and the Pacific Alliance. We measure districts’ trade competitiveness with an innovative combination of household survey and trade data. The evidence supports all three expectations. The findings contribute to research on trade policymaking, public opinion towards trade, and legislator behavior.