Conservatism and Switcher’s Curse

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2017-04-01 DOI:10.1093/ALER/AHW022
A. Edlin
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This article formally models the virtues of Edmund Burke’s conservatism, characterizes the optimal level of conservatism, and applies the model to management, law, and policy. I begin by introducing “switcher’s curse,” a trap in which a decision maker systematically switches too often. Decision makers suffer from switcher’s curse if they forget the reason that they maintained incumbent policies in the past and if they naively compare rival and incumbent policies with no bias for incumbent policies. Conservatism emerges as a heuristic to avoid switcher’s curse. The longer a process or policy has been in place, the more conservative one should be. On the other hand, the more conservative were past decision makers, the more progressive one should be today.
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保守主义和转换者的诅咒
本文对埃德蒙·伯克保守主义的优点进行了正式的建模,描述了保守主义的最优水平,并将该模型应用于管理、法律和政策。我首先介绍“切换者的诅咒”,这是一个决策者系统地频繁切换的陷阱。决策者们如果忘记过去坚持现行政策的原因,不顾现行政策的偏见,天真地比较竞争政策和现行政策,就会遭受“转换者诅咒”。保守主义作为一种启发式的方法出现,以避免转换者的诅咒。一个过程或政策实施的时间越长,就应该越保守。另一方面,过去的决策者越保守,今天的决策者就应该越进步。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
期刊介绍: The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.
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