{"title":"The effect of price discrimination on dynamic duopoly games with bounded rationality","authors":"Q. Song, Wei-li Zhang, Yi-Rong Jiang, Juan Geng","doi":"10.1515/snde-2019-0137","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a homogenous product market, customers’ different demand elasticities may lead to different prices. This study examined price discrimination’s effect on equilibrium points in Cournot duopoly games by assuming that each firm charges K prices and adjusts its strategies based on bounded rationality. In consideration of price discrimination, two discrete dynamic game systems with 2K variables were introduced for players with homogenous or heterogenous expectations. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point was found to be independent of price discrimination. Given price discrimination, the stability of boundary stationary points for the system with homogenous players is different from that for the system with heterogenous players. Numerical simulations verified the critical point for the system with homogenous players from being stable to its bifurcation.","PeriodicalId":46709,"journal":{"name":"Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics","volume":"26 1","pages":"287 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/snde-2019-0137","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/snde-2019-0137","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract In a homogenous product market, customers’ different demand elasticities may lead to different prices. This study examined price discrimination’s effect on equilibrium points in Cournot duopoly games by assuming that each firm charges K prices and adjusts its strategies based on bounded rationality. In consideration of price discrimination, two discrete dynamic game systems with 2K variables were introduced for players with homogenous or heterogenous expectations. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point was found to be independent of price discrimination. Given price discrimination, the stability of boundary stationary points for the system with homogenous players is different from that for the system with heterogenous players. Numerical simulations verified the critical point for the system with homogenous players from being stable to its bifurcation.
期刊介绍：
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics (SNDE) recognizes that advances in statistics and dynamical systems theory may increase our understanding of economic and financial markets. The journal seeks both theoretical and applied papers that characterize and motivate nonlinear phenomena. Researchers are required to assist replication of empirical results by providing copies of data and programs online. Algorithms and rapid communications are also published.
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